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Title of Research paper:   Research on formation of strategic alliance and its effect on  
container lines’ efficiency 
 
Degree:    MSc 
 
Shipping lines operate their fleets under circumstances of various uncertainties. To achieve 
diverse objectives including maximizing operating profit and minimizing operating costs in 
this unpredictable liner market, shipping lines have made use of collaboration strategy by 
forming or joining strategic alliances rather than competing with rival lines over the last two 
decades. These strategic alliances have an enormous influence on the liner market as well as 
on the performance of liner businesses. However, the actual benefits of a strategic alliance 
group toward its member companies are unclear. In this regard, this paper measured two 
types of relative efficiencies, which are financial and operational efficiencies for six shipping 
lines, COSCO, K Line, Yang Ming Line, Hanjin Shipping, Evergreen Line, and Maersk Line 
from 2010 to 2015. The researcher uses Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to assess the 
efficiencies. In particular, the output-oriented Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR), and 
Banker, Charnes and Cooper (BCC) models are used to attain technical efficiency, pure 
technical efficiency, and scale efficiency. To evaluate the financial efficiency, two inputs 
(total fixed assets and operating costs) are used as and two outputs (gross revenues and 
operating incomes) are employed. For measuring operational performance, two inputs 
(operating capacity and number of vessels) are chosen and two outputs (net revenue and total 
handled volume) are applied. The study showed that Maersk Line is the most efficient line 
financially and COSCO and K Line are the most efficient in their fleet operations of the six 
lines. In addition, joining a strategic alliance had a negative influence on Evergreen Line‟s 
financial and operational efficiency. This paper also deals with the overview of the 
restructuring strategic alliances, which are 2M, OCEAN and THE Alliance, with 
comparisons among three alliances.  
 
 
KEYWORDS: Liner shipping industry, strategic alliance, data envelopment analysis (DEA), 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
The shipping industry plays an important role in the growth of international trades, 
which leads to developments on national economies around the world. Remarkably, 
the proliferation of global trade and the growth of the world economy are directly 
related to the advance of liner services by shipping companies with maintaining 
competitiveness while providing efficient and effective transportation to various 
customers. Stopford (2009) gives a definition of the liner business. 
A liner service is a fleet of ships, with a common ownership or management, 
which provide a fixed service, at regular intervals, between named ports, and 
offer transport to any goods in the catchment area served by those ports and 
ready for transit by their sailing dates. A fixed itinerary, inclusion in a regular 
service, and the obligation to accept cargo from all comers and to sail, 
whether filled or not, on the date fixed by a published schedule are what 
distinguish the liner from the tramp. 
The amount of cargo volume traded by shipping lines has been grown along with the 
global economy. According to Notteboom (2012), the shipping industry has 
witnessed spectacular growth in container trade, fueled by the globalization process 
and the large-scale adoption of the container.This situation has causedlines to extend 
their market coverage globally as well asto escalatetheir fleets. Because of this, 
container shipping companies have burdens to satisfy diverse customers with the fact 
that offering new service routes and deploying more vessels are needed, which both 
cost a lot of money. In addition to this circumstance, there is huge competition 
between lines. All of this makes it difficult for the shipping companies to follow the 





Container shipping is a very capital-intensive industry, in which some assets are 
owned and others leased and there exists a wide variability in cost bases (Brooks, 
2000). As mentioned above, to satisfy customers, lines should invest in ships. 
Therefore, asset management is a key part of container shipping companies for 
operational and commercial success. Container shipping lines are particularly 
challenged to develop an effective asset management program, which includes the 
procurement, acquisition, deployment, and disposal of container vessels (Notteboom, 
2012). Once linesinvest in fleet expansion and liner service networks, there is 
pressure to fill the ships with containerized cargo because the unused capacity on 
them cannot be stored and used in the future. Moreover, volatile revenues caused by 
trade imbalances and seasonal cycles also make it difficult for lines to manage their 
operating incomes.  
 
Shipping companies often cooperate with each other in order to cope with various 
problems, including the aforementioned things. The first steps along the path of 
cooperation are taken in the form of loose operational agreements. Depending on the 
degree of collaboration, these can be classified into five broad groups: space 
purchase, space exchange, cost pooling, revenue pooling, and revenue and marketing 
pools (Packard, 1995). In the 1990s, strategic alliances were initially formedby lines, 
and they substituted conferences, which were used for freight rate unity to secure 
lines‟ profit because of the declining antitrust immunity. Trade agreements in the 
form of liner conferences were very common until the European Commission 
outlawed these forms of cooperation in October 2008 (Notteboom, 2012). Strategic 
alliancesoffers container shipping companies various benefits such as risk sharing, 
investment sharing, wider geographical scope, and entry into new markets. 
Majorliner shipping firms, which provide global services, have formed or joined the 
strategic alliances since they appeared in the liner industry. Presently, there are four 
major alliances: 2M, Ocean three(O3), CKYHE, and G6, whose membership consists 




percent of the global shipping capacity (Bockrath and Arnord, 2015). Likewise, the 
groups of strategic alliances have an enormous influence on the international liner 
service market as well as shipping lines‟ financial and operational strategies. Of 
course, there is a negative point of view toward the strategic alliances for reasons 
such as market domination by oligopolistic behaviors. However, it is quite important 
for lines to make use of the alliance as a strategy to increase profits and reduce costs. 
The groups of alliances are taking a significant position in liner society because most 
major lines are willing to stay within the boundaries of strategic alliances; these days, 
the restructuring of the strategic alliances is becoming a hot issue in the shipping 
industry. Two new groups of strategic alliances will enter liner market next year, and 
it can be expected that the liner service market will be changed tremendously by the 
three strategic alliances. 
 
 
1.2 Purpose of research 
This research will identify whether joining or forming a strategic alliance in liner 
shipping industry can improve the productivity and profitability of the member 
companies. According to Farrell (1957), firms‟ productivity can be measured by the 
ratio of outputs to inputs. A firm can improve its productivity by increasing outputs, 
decreasing inputs, or doing both, and many research papers mentioned that a 
strategic alliance helps the member companies to reduce the number of inputs 
through sharing resources, and to increase outputs through synergy and cooperation 
among members. This implies that shipping lines are able to attain better productivity 
and profitability after joining a strategic alliance. So as to identify the influence of a 
strategic alliance on the member companies, I will measure an alteration of 
efficiency for six shipping lines, which are COSCO, K Line, Yang Ming, Hanjin, 
Evergreen, and Maersk,from 2010 to 2015. Among the six firms, COSCO, K Line, 
Yang Ming, and Hanjin were members of CKYH alliance until 2013, and with one 




biggest international liner service company in terms of operating capacity throughout 
the whole test period. 
Evergreen Line used to have a go-it-alone strategy. However, in 2014, the company 
changed its management strategy towardworking together with other competitors 
toform strategic alliances like other major lines. It is not strange consideringsixteen 
of the twenty largest shipping firms by capacity operate their fleet with other lines by 
cooperating as members of a strategic alliance, and they control 75% of the global 
shipping capacity. In this regard, I will examine some motivations for joining or 
forming strategic alliances. In addition, I will examine thetransition of lines‟ 
efficiency before and after joining or forming strategic alliance. 
 
Strategic alliances have been changed theirstructure by shuffling of member firms 
through newly forming or dissolving alliances. This means that the strategic alliances 
are not permanent cooperative groups. Nowadays, shipping lines announce that they 
will form and operate their fleets under the groups of new strategic alliances. In this 
regard, I will review the latest changes of the liner industry along with the restructure 
of strategic alliances. 
 
To achieve these purposes, in the next chapter, I will review literature that is related 
to the subject of strategic alliance and the methodology, which will be utilized to 
measure shipping lines‟ efficiency. In chapter 3, this dissertation will cover the 
general characteristics of the international liner shipping industry, and it will contain 
a brief history of the formation of strategic alliances by dividing the whole period 
into four generations. Next, in chapter 4, I will investigate the strategic alliance itself, 
in detail, such as the definition, various objections to choose to form or join strategic 
alliances from the lines‟ point of views, and some drawbacks of the alliance. In 
addition, I will look into Evergreen Line regarding operating strategies and history of 




types of efficiencies of six lines, which are financial and operational efficiency for 
the period from 2010 to 2015 by data envelopment analysis (DEA). The results of the 
analysis will be included in chapter 6. The next chapter, will contain a general 
overview on restructuring of strategic alliances and a general analysis on three 
alliances (2M, OCEAN alliance, and THE alliance). Finally, I will end this research 




The main purpose of this research paper is to measure the efficiencies of six lines. 
Generally, for assessment efficiency, an equation of output variable divided by input 
variable is applied. However, calculating the efficiencies is complex for shipping 
lines with more than one input and output variable. In this regard, the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) tool has drawn researchers‟ attentions because it is a 
non-parametric technique used in operating research and econometrics for 
multivariate frontier estimation and ranking, which can be used for calculating 
apparent efficiency levels within a group of organizations (Panayies et al, 2009). It 
can be exploited to analyze relative efficiency with multiple input and output 
variables. Therefore, I will adapt DEA to assess the relative efficiency among the six 
shipping lines. To do so, I will use the input and output variables as follows. 
 Input variable for DEA 
1) Fixed asset  
2) Operating cost 
 
 
3) Total operating capacity  
4) Number of vessels 
 Output variable for DEA 
1) Gross revenue 
2) Operating income 
 
 
3) Handled volume of cargo 





Chapter 2 Literature review 
 
The objective of this chapter is to review research papers in the past related to a topic 
of strategic alliance in liner shipping industry and non-shipping industry, and to look 
through how the data envelopment analysis tool was used for research in shipping 
and non-shipping industry. The literature reviews will be categorized into two parts. 
One part will be regarding strategic alliance which is the key topic in my research 
paper, the other will be about the methodology, data envelopment analysis, used to 
measure the efficiency and performance for both the shipping industry and Non-
shipping industry.  
 
2.1 Previous research into strategic alliance 
2.1.1 Liner shipping industry 
Bockrath (2015) examined how changes in the liner shipping sector‟s market 
structure have impacted the global trading system. The author did the research by 
empirically examining how shipping alliances have impacted bilateral trade flows 
from January 2011 to February 2015 by identifying the alliance behavior on a route 
level and a trade level. To examine the relationship between liner shipping alliances 
and trade flows, this researcher used a gravity model, which integrating variables to 
measure the intensity of alliance activity. The empirical results suggested that 
shipping alliances appears to be inhibiting bilateral trade in a manner consistent with 
the exercise of market power, although this negative result does not hold for every 
alliance. Analysis of the major alliances revealed that they do not substantially vary 
in their commercial behavior but did substantially vary in how frequently alliance 
members deviate from the alliance structure, suggesting this result was being driven 





Tan and Thai (2014) studied the knowledge sharing mechanisms presented within 
liner shipping alliances, and identified how knowledge sharing positively impact on 
the firm‟s performance using the qualitative method of face to face in-depth 
interviews.  
 
Gao, Yoshida and Choi (2014) investigated the effect of alliance onprofit rate in the 
Japanese liner shipping industry by Porter‟s five forces analysis and empirical 
analysis with data in 1990, 2000, and 2010. They found that alliances pull down the 
freight rate, which is not caused by changing the market concentration, but by the 
worsening of the supply and demand balance and reducing costs by the development 
of large-sized ships. They contributed to providing evidence for the effect of the 
alliance on the profit rate in the liner shipping industry. However, this empirical 
study only focuses on two Japanese shipping companies, NYK and MOL. 
 
Song and Panayides (2002) applied cooperative game theory to analyze cooperation 
among members of liner shipping strategic alliance. In addition, they included in 
their research paper various objectives of forming global shipping strategic alliances 
and methods to have alliance stability and efficiency. The authors proved two thing 
using cooperative game theory in this paper. One is whether the shipping lines will 
have the cooperative strategy by forming strategic alliance or having go-it-alone 
strategy. The other one is why the shipping alliances tend to be unstable.  
 
Huang and Yoshida (2013) reviewed important academic journals for the past decade 
regarding to the most important reasons to form the alliances. The authors explained 
the motive of alliances and details of shipping cooperation. They identified strategic 
alliance restructure in four different perspectives, which were the service quality 
perspective, the management perspective, the market structure perspective, and the 




They also empirically investigated the key service quality requirements improved 
through alliances by using quality function deployment (QFD). The results were that 
the top four service quality requirements improved are business reputation, less 
transit time, intermodal service and cheaper service. 
 
Das (2011) identified and tested specific factors (synergy type, nature of resources, 
redundant resources, market uncertainty, and market competition) that influence liner 
shipping firms in their strategic choice between partnerships and acquisitions. Cox 
regressions were used for the analysis, results are that two factors, the extent of 
redundant resources and the intensity of competition, increase the likelihood of the 
choice of acquisition, while a third factor, the nature of resources, affects the 
likelihood of acquisition in an inverted-U shaped manner. In addition, the home 
region of a firm and prior acquisition experience increases the probability of 
acquisitions while prior partnership experience decrease it. The level of synergy and 
degree of market uncertainty do not affect the mode of alliance choice. 
 
Slack, Comtois, Mccalla and Slack (2002) examined developments in liner shipping 
in terms of the formation of strategic alliances by the leading companies. They 
focused on the transformation of services, the evolution of the fleet, and the 
adjustments made to the ports of call to examine container shipping development in 
the three specific years, 1989, 1994, and 1999. 
 
Chen and Yahalom (2013) studied slot co-allocation planning for a joint fleet in a 
round trip for a shipping alliance in the liner shipping industry. A large-scale integer 
programming model is formulated to guide carriers in an alliance in pursuing an 
optimal slot co-allocation strategy. For this model application, a joint fleet of two 
shipping lines, COSCO and Hanjin Shipping, at an Asia-Europe trade route was used 




with the shipping alliance performance outcomes.  
Ryoo and Thanopoulou (1999) suggests that alliances are a distinct form of 
cooperation for Asian carriers, which they can benefit from, in order to face the 
challenges by the changes on the demand side of container trades. They said alliance, 
as all cooperation forms, can prove powerful tool for adapting to the changing 
circumstances of the Asian Trades, and coordination and adaptation to changing 
volumes and required frequency is optimized as the number of vessels inside the 
cooperation is increased. Also, they mentioned that alliance participation may also 
prove not only a more flexible but also a quicker tool for adapting to market 
conditions in changing times. The empirical evidence based on a survey was only 
about the perception of alliances and of the benefits of alliance participation by only 
a specific group of Asian carriers sharing a common geographical origin. 
 
Midoro and Pitto (2000) examined the key reasons why shipping companies join at 
strategic alliances and argued that their current structure may prove inherently 
inadequate to remain stability. Organizational complexity of the alliance and 
establishment of an intra-alliance competition were the key forces driving the 
strategic alliance unstable. Two authors explained building stable alliances that were 
reduction in number of partners, differentiation in their roles and contribution and 
coordination of sales and marketing activities. Authors expected more mergers and 
take-overs realized until a new generation of more efficient and stable alliance will 
be made. 
 
Ding (2009) applied the modified extent analysis method of fuzzy AHP approach for 
selecting suitable partners of strategic alliance for a liner shipping company. To find 
out the most appropriate company for selecting the partner of strategic alliance based 
on the proposed fuzzy AHP algorithm, the author studied an empirical survey of lines. 




partner selection for a liner shipping company with seven criteria, thirty-two sub 
criteria and three alternatives. 
Panayides and Wiedmer (2011) examined the structure and conduct of strategic 
alliances, Grand Alliance, New World Alliance and CKYH Alliance, in container 
liner shipping with the service characteristics of the top 20 container shipping in 
2010. In addition, authors identified the motives for the formation of alliances in 
liner shipping by examining over a ten-year period the announcements of companies 
forming or agreeing the alliance partnership and the reason that the companies 
themselves provide as motive for its formation.    
 
2.1.2 Non-shipping industry 
Xu and Ruan (2012) discussed the construction of Shapley Value and its economy 
implication, on which the rent of alliance, and the benefit of alliance system was 
studied. The result proved that the member of alliance with competitive resource 
could gain the most individual rent of enterprise alliance. 
 
Lin (2013) used data envelopment analysis and stochastic frontier analysis to assess 
the airlines‟ technical efficiency, while panel regression analysis for airline 
productivity and profitability. The author focused on 20 international airlines 
between 1995 and 2005 periods from two main categories: allied airlines, which 
included three global airline strategic alliances, and non-allied airlines. The author 
found that joining an airline strategic alliance group generally will have positive 
effects on its member airlines‟ technical efficiency, productivity and profitability. 
However, the results was not statistically significant, which meant that the effects of 
an airline alliance group are practically unimportant to the airline performance during 
the study period. Also, the author suggested that the number of alliance member do 
not always have a positive impact on the airline performance, size of the alliance 






2.2 Previous research using Data Envelopment Analysis 
2.2.1 Shipping industry 
Chou and Lee (2007) applied a performance index to the evaluation of shipping 
alliance competitiveness using Multidimensional Scale Method (MDS), which 
include DEA‟S strength that is in simultaneously considering multiple inputs and 
outputs without any need for a priori assignment of weight. They used data for five 
shipping alliances and two operation zones in 1999. They wrote in this paper that 
with these performance indices, shipping alliances can identify their strength and 
weakness as well as competitive positions by the output/input by aggregating the 
performance indices.  
 
Bang, Kang, Martin and Woo (2012) examined the impact of operational and 
strategic management on financial and operational efficiency using a two-stage DEA 
approach, which combined the DEA and Tobit regression. To measure the operational 
efficiency, the authors used the number of ships and fleet capacity in TEUs as inputs 
and capacity in TEUs carried by lines as an output variable for DEA analysis. To 
calculate the finance efficiency, they had total assets and capital expenditure as input 
variables and revenues and operating profits as output variables. Using the DEA tool, 
they showed the efficiency scores of financial and operational models for 14 lines out 
of top 20 container lines in terms of fleet capacity in 2008. The results from the Tobit 
regression were that the firm size, ship size, the ratio of chartered vessels, use of new 
vessels, and the formation of alliances all make a positive contribution to the 
financial performance of shipping lines. Ship age and ship type did not show a 






Panayides el al (2011) measured the relative efficiency for shipping companies in the 
dry bulk, wet bulk and container sectors using Data Envelopment Analysis and 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis. The research paper showed that productivity and 
market efficiency are two different measures of performance efficiency. The results 
showed that some companies or sectors may be highly productivity efficient but not 
market efficient in the same level, or vice versa.   
 
Hsu, Chung, Lee and Sherman (2013) measured the performance of seven tramp 
shipping companies using network data envelopment analysis and balance score 
cards. To check the efficiency of the tramp shipping companies, they used 10 
variables of inputs and outputs, which are fixed assets, current assets, operating costs, 
non-operating expenses, total assets turnover, cash flow ratio, operating revenue, 
non-operating revenue, earnings per share and net income.  
 
Bang and Kang (2011) evaluated performances for 12 ocean carriers by data 
envelopment analysis. Static-efficiency analysis is adapted to assess financial and 
operational performance with 3 inputs and 3 outputs in 2007, and dynamic-efficiency 
analysis are used to show the stability and trend of efficiency by DEA-Window 
model between 2004 and 2007. 
 
Lee and Kim (2006) measured the relative efficiency of 50 Korean shipping 
companies using data envelopment analysis. They applied CCR-O and BCC-O 
models to evaluate the efficiency in 2004. Number of employee, fixed assets and 
total capital are used as inputs variables, and total revenue, operating income and net 
income are utilized as output variable. In addition, they applied DEA-Window model 






2.2.2 Non-shipping industry 
Panayides, Maxoulis, Wang and Ng (2009) identified certain limitations in the 
application of DEA for seaport efficiency measurement. A key issue identified in the 
paper was the need for researchers to decide on the number of inputs and outputs to 
be used in the model in relation to sample size. Authors mentioned that greater 
number of inputs/outputs is desirable in order to capture the complexity of port 
production, however, the sample size must be adequate otherwise results may be 
biased. They also highlighted the limitations of using cross-sectional data.  
 
Somogyi, R, M. (2011) examined how the DEA method is applied in the transport 
sector such as airports, ports, railways and airlines. The author collected 69 cases 
with DEA applications and classified 69 cases into inputs and outputs variables. 
 
Bhagavath, V. (2006) investigated technical efficiency for 44 of state road transport 
undertakings in India using a variable retune to scale model of data envelopment 
analysis. Fleet size, average kilometers traveled per bus per day and cost per bus per 





Chapter 3 Liner shipping industry 
 
3.1 General characteristics of container shipping industry 
The container shipping is a kind of maritime transport similar to train or bus as 
means of transportation with fixed schedules, designated ports of call and named 
ships, which it has the core activity the delivery of unitized container boxes. The first 
modern container vessel, Ideal X, was launched by Malcolm McLean who developed 
the modern intermodal shipping container, half-century ago. This time was 
considered the beginning of container shipping era. The containership was rarely 
used in the early period of liner shipping, however, in the mid of 1960s, the container 
shipping industry developed drastically because of the introduction of standard 
container sizes resulted from an economic motivation for higher productivity and the 
awareness of the shipping lines about the benefits of using containerships like saving 
a lot of time of loading and discharging cargos by container boxes. 
 
Figure 1Growth of liner trade, 1973 ~ 2007 
Source: Stopford (2009) 
 
The amount of containerized cargo grew rapidly from 1975 to 2007 in Figure 1. It 
started from 14.1 million TEU, the number of container lifted, in 1975, and it reached 
to about 470 million TEU for 32 years. The average growth rate between 1990 and 




The increasing world GDP rate due to the economic growth of developing countries 
is one of the driving forces increasing the amount of merchandise trade and the world 
seaborne trade. More and more economic growth for nations, people want to have 
more stuff for better living condition. This kinds of the economic activities of 
countries have expended foreign trade among countries, it affects demand of the 
maritime transports such as bulk carriers, gas carrier and oil carrier. The increasing 
demand for container shipping is also affected by the requirement to carry particular 
kinds of goods.    
 
Figure 2Merchandise trade and seaborne shipments, 1975 – 2014 (1990 = 100) 
Source: UNCTAD (2015) Review of maritime transport 2015 
 
The diagram, Figure 2, shows four kinds of index, which are world merchandise 
trade, world seaborne trade, world GDP and OECD industrial production between 
1975 and 2014. The trend for all indices are similar that they mostly indicate going-
up trend except the years from 1979 to 1982 and from 2007 to 2009. This means that 
increasing the world GDP and the OECD industrial production played the key role 
on growing for world merchandise trade and world seaborne trade.  
 
With increasing demand for international trade, the amount of various cargoes 




offers a more accurate measure of demand for shipping services and tonnage as it 
takes into account distance, which determines ships‟ transportation capacity over 
time (UNCTAD, 2015). Figure 3 represents the phenomenon of international ocean 
trade in terms of ton-miles by cargo types from 2000 to 2015. It shows that the 
numbers of ton-miles for containerized cargo as well as the other type of cargos are 
rising over the whole period except the year of 2009, which the financial crisis 
hugely affected the world economic negatively and the trade amount by the maritime 
transportation was diminished. 
 
Figure 3World seaborne trade in cargo ton-mile by cargo type (billions of ton-miles) 
Source: UNCTAD (2015) Review of maritime transport 2015 
 
The growth rate of demand for delivery of containerized cargo has been faster than 
that of the other types of cargo, shipping lines have been applied various operational 
strategies over time from go-it-alone strategy, which denotes doing things alone 
independently, to cooperation between rival companies through types of formation 
from conferences to strategic alliance. Especially, topics related to the strategic 
alliance in liner shipping industry draw public attention nowadays because a number 
of shipping lines, which have high market shares in markets, are involved in the 
strategic alliances as members, and it has been said that they influence on the 
competitiveness and the financial performance of container shipping companies. 




forming or banding of strategic alliances and how much they will affect the 
companies‟ operational and financial performances. Before going further, I will 




Since the Second World War, world trade has grown much more rapidly than the 
world production has. A main reason is that trade barriers to the free flow of goods, 
services and capital among countries have generally been diminishing after the 
1960‟s and the rapid and continuous development of transport and 
telecommunication technology. Especially, the development of new transport 
technology and the continuous decrease of transport cost due to improved 
productivities have led to the formation of the global integrated market place (Shuo, 
2015). This trends have an effects on the formation of globalization. Globalization 
does not entail only a dispersal of the production process to various geographic 
locations to take advantage of differences in cost and quality of productive factors, 
but also converging consumer tastes and preferences, leading to the emergence of 
global brands (Midoro and Pitto, 2000). The globalization has played a critical role 
on change of companies‟ operational strategies in line with transformation of 
thinking toward the world as one huge market and that competitions in liner shipping 
industries are international. The result of the conversion of ideas by the globalization 
alter the container shipping firms to satisfy their customers based on over the world. 
This means that the shipping lines need to increase and expand their services in terms 
of frequency, schedule reliability, global coverage of services and appropriate rate 
setting. Brooks (2000) mentioned that the liner shipping industry has witnessed 
enormous changes due to the globalization, which affected variously such as new 
logistics needs by shippers and higher requirements for operational flexibility as well 
as for an expanded geographical coverage of trading service routes. According to 




become a common phenomenon, so the pressure for cooperation that can reduce 
costs, share the risk of over committing capital, add to market coverage and increase 
market control through the combined activities of what would have been individual 
competitors.  
3.1.2 Economies of scale 
While there may be several reasons for cooperation among shipping lines, the main 
reason for collaboration with rival firms is to achieve economies of scale. 
 
Figure 4Long run average cost curve 
Source: www.economicsonline.co.uk 
 
The first left part of green line from dot A in Figure 4 shows the economies of scales, 
which it exists when a production cost (cost & revenue, vertical axis) of a product 
decreases when the number of units (output, horizontal axis) produced increases. To 
make most use of the scale economies for companies in the liner shipping industry, 
two methods can be taken, which are by adaptation of intrinsic and extrinsic 
strategies. 
 
(1) Extrinsic strategy 
After beginning with the containerization revolution in the 1950s, innovation has 




economies of scale has led the major trends for shipping lines, which it regarded as a 
main characteristics of container shipping industry, ranging from looser agreements 
of slot chartering to more integrated cooperation such as strategic alliance, 
consolidation, and merger and acquisition, which they can be called horizontal 
integration. It refers to cooperation between two or more companies competing in the 
same sector or market (Hill et al, 2014). In addition, shipping lines try to exploit 
scale economies by vertical integration, which it refers consolidation of supply chain. 
The major liner shipping players such as Maersk Line, Hanjin Shipping, and COSCO 
are making use of the scale economy by horizontal and vertical integrations.  
 
The horizontal integration in liner shipping can be divided two parts, which are 
cooperation on rates and cooperation on operational matters. The former type of 
horizontal integration is that for the purpose of regulating and restricting competition 
in order to achieve relative stability on rates, and offer regular and reasonable 
frequency of sailings. The conference system can be categorized into this type of 
horizontal integration. The latter type integration is the cooperation among container 
shipping companies in order to have benefits such as cost reduction and global 
coverage of liner services without price-fixing. Slot chartering agreement, vessel 
sharing agreement, consortia, strategic alliances and merger and acquisition are 
included into this type of horizontal integration. There are some advantages and 
disadvantages of horizontal cooperation with rival company below. 
 Advantages of horizontal cooperation of liner shipping industry 
1) Monopolistically competitive market economies of scale 
2) Cost control: slot sharing, terminal sharing, improvement of utilization 
3) Expansion by lower capital investment 
4) Alternative method to upgrade fleet-optimal age, optimal size, optimal structure 
5) More clients and network  
6) Stronger bargaining power 




1) Anti-trust by authorities 
2) Business overlap 
3) Lack of flexibility 
4) Loss of corporate independence 
On the other hands, the vertical integration in shipping lines is differently approached 
by extending the shipping services to port terminals, storage and inland transport. 
Purchasing a container leasing company by a shipping line or buying a shipping 
companies by a freight forwarder can be examples of vertical integration. Figure 5 
shows the process of integration levels. The circles indicate logistic chain in each 
process for cargo flow from a sender to a final customer. The level of integration 
among entities are increasing from top to bottom. With an increasing level of 
integration intermediate steps in the transport chains are removed. The highest 
integration level is seen in the bottom, which indicate the mega carrier developed by 
merge and acquisition. This is the highest scale economies.  
 
Figure 5Freight integration in supply chains 
Source: Notteboom and Rodrigue (2004) 
 
 
There are some pros and cons of vertical consolidation through supply change. 




2) Value added  
3) Larger market coverage 
 
4) Increased consumer network 
5) Economies of scale and scope 
6) Exchange of knowledge 
 Drawbacks of vertical integration 
1) Conflict in business 
orientation 
2) Conflict in business structure 
3) Competition distortion 
 
4) Loss of corporate identity  
5) Lack of flexibility  
6) Administrative expenses
 
The vertical integration has been exercised as a strategy in order to create added 
value or to generate revenue or to increase margins. Also, it can be used as a 
complementary strategy to integration along the logistic chain, and it can be 
sustainable way of differentiating business over rival companies. The biggest scale of 
liner shipping company, Maersk Line, is a good example that it makes use of the 
vertical integrations with sub-companies such as Maersk Line, APM terminal and 
logistic service company through their supply chain. 
 
Figure 6Core business units, Maersk Line 
Source: Maersk group, annual report 2013 
 




Figure 7 shows the container fleet development by ship size in TEU. Left side graph 
presents containership development between 8,000 TEU and 12,000 TEU from 1996 
to 2016, while right side indicates containership growth over 12,000 TEU between 
2003 and 2016. According to the graphs, the container carriers ranged over 8000 
TEU and below 12,000 TEU sizes revealed to market since 1997, and the scale of 
these types of vessels have raised always for the period of time. Similarly, ships, 
which can load more than 12,000 TEU, introduced since 2005, and the number of the 
vessel has risen for the whole period.  
 
Figure 7Containership fleet development, 8,000-12,000 TEU and over 12,000 TEU 
Source: Clarkson Research Services 
 
Likewise, shipping lines have exploited scale economies by purchasing and 
deploying big size vessels to reduce unit costs of transportation as well as to satisfy 
shipper‟s demand with low freight rates.   
 
3.1.3 Capital intensity 
Container shipping is a very capital intensive industry where some assets are owned 
and others leased and there exists a wide variability in cost bases (Brooks, 2000). To 
provide liner services to customers in an era of globalization, container shipping 




most lines in the world top 20 in terms of operating fleets capacity chartered a lot of 
vessels and made order to buy new ships to provide more service routes with 
frequent time interval with the objective to take higher market shares than rival firms.  
However, operating profits for shipping lines is historically low these days with 
relative low freight rates compared than operating cost. The rates on major trade 
routes have dropped more than the gains in productivity. This prolonged 
unsatisfactory financial performance in container shipping industry is one of forces 
inducing shipping lines collaborating and forming various types of alliance to 
minimize operating costs. 
 




According to Stopford (2009), both volatility and cyclical patterns are due to an 
inherent mismatch between demand and supply of shipping. In particular, the 
problem is that while demand for shipping may change even in short time, as a result 
of alteration in local, regional or world economy and trade, sea cargo carrier 
companies cannot control it. For example, a liner shipping company want to add new 
capacity immediately in response to an increasing in demand for cargo, however, it 




delayed from the time when it would be needed by various shippers. This in turn 
causes surplus in supply when demand is low, which consequently makes freight 
rates decrease. From shipping companies‟ point of view, this situation is very risky. 
When demand is peak, companies should invest a high amount of capital resource in 
deploying new capacity, when facing the perilous situation, which demand and 
freight rates are dropping continually, it makes the shipping companies troublesome 
to recover the invested capital resource. When the duration of low demand and 
freight are expected for a long time, carriers want to dispose their unused capacity by 
selling through a second-hand vessel market or by scraping, or by laying up the ships. 
However, it is not straightforward to eliminate overcapacity in a low demand market 
condition. It is unlikely to find a buyer for ships when owners still pay part of 
expenses for the unused vessels.‟ Figure 9 shows the differences between demand 
and supply in container shipping from 2000 to 2015. Only 4 years (2005, 2007, 2011, 
and 2013) out of 16 years are same or similar rates between two indices. 
 
Figure 9Growth of demand and supply in container shipping, 2000-2015 
Source: UNCTAD. (2015). Review of maritime transport 2015 
 
In addition to above, there are a lot of volatility in liner shipping market such as 
freight rates (Figure 10), exchange currency, time charter rates (Figure 11), bunker 
prices (Figure 12), and global economic situation. These are driving forces to push 
containership companies toward formation of alliances among them to gain the 





Figure 10Freight rates from Shanghai to Europe, 2010 - 2015 
Source: BIMCO, Shanghai Shipping Exchange 
 
 
Figure 11T/C rates for container ships, 2005-2014 Figure 12Price fluctuation for bunker fuel (IFO 380), 2000-2015 
Source: RS Platou. (2015). The Platou Report 2015 Source: Clarksons Research Studies 
 
 
3.2 Overview of strategic alliance in liner market 
3.2.1 Origin of cooperation 
The history of the container shipping industry has been various formations of 
organizational cooperation. In 1875, the first conference was formed to limit the 
competition among rival companies and to control the freight rates in the market. 
Clarke (1997) mentioned that the shipping lines were historically organized in 
conferences, which like carters that set price schedules for their members, restricted 




of liner conferences is to stabilize the freight level by regulating the capacity and/or 
applying conference tariffs (Shuo, 2015).  
 
Most nations at that time granted the companies in the shipping sector antitrust 
immunity for the sake of protecting the nation‟s maritime influence. Many 
researchers argued that the conferences played a vital role in cartels to get high profit 
and inhibited the development of the global economic. Others include Sjostrom 
(2004) believed that the conferences were a necessary evil since container shipping 
companies suffered from an empty core, which means that there is no competitive 
equilibrium and it could be an effective check against the inherent instability that 
would plague the market in a purely competitive situation. Even though, there was 
controversial against cooperation as conferences, however, it remained for more than 
a century. This is because of the believing that the fluctuation of demand and supply 
for maritime transportation, a secured income was important for the shipping lines to 
maintain and operate services in the capital-intensive market, and shipper also could 
be got benefit by the remained services.  
 
However, the regulatory changes have directly ended the conferences among 
shipping lines. In 1998, the United States passed the “Ocean Shipping Reform Act 
(OSRA)”, which required conference to allow their member firms to confidentially 
deviate from the conference system (Lewis and Vellenga, 2000). In 2006, the Europe 
Nations when further and outright stripped conferences of any anti-trust immunity 
(Bockrath, 2015). These changes of laws in the major economic areas made the 
traditional co-operational groups, the conferences, unacceptable. 
 
3.2.2 Advent of consortia 
After the containerization revolution, new form of cooperation, called as consortia, 




the early 1970s with some features such as limitation to the vessel, space sharing and 
tonnage control. The second but last stage of consortia were more integrated among 
member companies, which it involved not only operational and technical 
collaboration, but also commercial and financial decision. Due to slow decision 
process and structural problem, which they were disadvantages toward independent 
companies, the first stage of consortia started to fall in the1980s. And also, the 
second stage of consortia became out of date because the two giant governments, U.S. 
and E.U., were unfavorable toward the freight control and capacity management.  
 
3.2.3Appearance of strategic alliance 
The emergence of global markets with world economic growth, the increased service 
of shipping companies in non-conference but in a fierce and capital intensive market, 
and the considered illegal under anti-trust laws were contributed to the restructuring 
of the liner shipping industry. This has led to a traditional conference disappear and a 
tremendous increase in efficiency-enhancing operating agreements. At the end of the 
conference system, shipping lines were looking for the other type of cooperation, 
strategic alliance.  
 
Alliances very widely in their organizational structure, but broadly speaking an 
alliance is composed of a set of individual firms that co-operate their vessel 
deployments and share space on their vessels, allowing them to reach a wider range 
of destinations and customers (Brooks, 2000). Compared to conferences, alliances 
are less restrictive in their actions, as they are barred from directly setting prices and 
allow independent competition amongst their members. In addition, alliances are 
much larger in scale than the traditional conferences, as many alliances collectively 
span the globe and the combined membership of some alliances control substantial 
portions of the global shipping market (Bockrath, 2015). The shipping companies in 




capacity through the operating cooperation among member companies in alliance 
such as sharing vessel, terminal and equipment, joint- scheduling, and slot chartering. 
 
(1) First generation (1994 – 1996) 
In 1994, the new type of cooperation group, called strategic alliance, was emerged to 
the shipping market by four carriers: namely, APL, OOCL, MOL and Royal 
Nedlloyd Lines. The „Global Alliance‟ was the name for the first strategic alliance 
and it had an objective to establish an integrated Europe – Far East service route. The 
Grand Alliance of Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, NOL and P&O was formed in 1996. In 
addition, Maersk and Sealand agreed to cooperate in a same strategic alliance, 
Maerck-Sealand. The first generation for the period between 1994 and 1996, the 
international liner shipping markets were dominated by the three alliances, which 
were Global Alliance, Grand Alliance and Maersk & Sea-Land, and independents 
major container shipping companies such as CMA, CGM and Evergreen Line.  
 
(2) Second generation (1997 – 2000) 
The second generation of strategic alliance was formed by the global mergers and 
acquisitions from 1997 to 2000. There was an Asian financial crisis in 1997, which 
was started by the financial collapse in Thailand, it affected the imbalance of vessels‟ 
capacity on supply and demand. In response, the major shipping lines changed their 
market structure by mergers and acquisitions with rival and cooperation lines to 
reduce operating cost and to solve the problems came from the initial organization of 
global alliance such as overlapped business and complexity of strategic alliance. 
Through this period, P&OCL merged with Nedlloyd, NOL merged with APL and 
Hanjin took the DSR-Senator. And the CMA acquired the CGM and CP Ships gained 
CAST, Lykes Line and Contship. In 1999, Maersk Line got Sea-Land and it became 
the biggest liner shipping company as named Maersk-Sealand. P&ON, MISC and 




other companies, APL-NOL and MOL, changed the Global Alliance to New World 
Alliance, and Hanjin made United Alliance with DSR-Senator and Cho Yang 
Shipping. Also, CKY Alliance was formed by COSCO, K-Line and Yang Ming. 
Therefore, there were four strategic alliances, which are the Grand Alliance, New 
World Alliance, United Alliance and CKY Alliance, two giant independent shipping 
lines, Maersk-Sealand and Evergreen-Lloyd Triestino, and minor companies in 
second generation period.  
 
(3) Third generation (2001 – 2010) 
In the mid of 1990s, an estimated 60% of total global liner capacity was accounted 
for by alliances (Agarwal and Ergun, 2010). Likewise, the formation of liner 
shipping strategic alliances has been a dominant form of cooperation among lines 
since the early 1990s. In 2002, the United Alliance was disbanded and the Hanjin, 
former member of the United Alliance, joined CKY Alliance, as a result, CKYH 
Alliance emerged. The Maersk-Sealand took the P&ON and became a Maersk Line 
in 2005. After these changes, the liner shipping markets were operated by three 
strategic alliances, which are the New World Alliance, Grand Alliance and CKYH 
Alliance, two giant shipping lines, Maersk Line and Evergreen Line, which they 
provide global liner services, and big scale companies such as CMA-CGM, CSCL 
and MSC.  
 
(4) Fourth generation (2011 – 2016) 
The period of fourth generation was started by the consolidation with two alliances, 
the New World Alliance and Grand Alliance, and they became a G6 Alliance in 2011. 
After two years, the world‟s three largest container shipping lines, Maersk, MSC, and 
CMA CGM, announced an operational alliance on three of the world busiest trade 
routes, Asia/North America, Asia/Europe, and Transatlantic with a name of P3 




aimed at delivering maximum cost efficiency. The companies assure that the alliance 
can deliver more stable, frequent and flexible services, with CMA CGM citing the P3 
network‟s capacity to offer 8 weekly sailing between Asia and Northern Europe. 
Despite this unified approach, each company was still set to have fully independent 
sales, pricing, marketing, and customer service functions.On June, 2014, China‟s 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), following a review under China‟s merger 
control rules, refused approval for the proposed P3 joint venture despite approval 
from the U.S. and the E.U. competition authorities. The reason for the refusal is that 
the proposed arrangement would integrate the market power of the parties and 
consolidate their operating network, eliminating effective competition between major 
competitors and raising entry barriers to the market. After that, COSCO, K-Line, 
Yang Ming, Hanjin and Evergreen Line announced they agreed to establish a 
shipping alliance, and CMA-CGM, CSCL and UASC also reported to make a new 
alliance, named Ocean 3 Alliance in the same year. In 2015, Maersk Line and MSC 
formed 2M Alliance, and the COSCO and CSCL announced to be integrated and to 





Figure 13Development of alliances on the Far East – North Europe route 




Chapter 4 Strategic alliance 
 
4.1 Definition of strategic alliance 
Initially, the term strategic alliance was used to describe a contractual relationship 
between a firm with a marketable technology and one with the capability to produce 
the product and/or bring it to market and its application to the transport industry has 
been much later than in other industry sectors (Brooks, 2000). Today, the terms 
strategic alliance is used to describe a wide range of organizational structures in 
which two or more businesses cooperate for mutual benefit and ideally share 
common goals; the relationship is symbiotic and voluntary (Brooks, 2000). Yao 
(2003) mentioned that Hopland and Nigel proposed the concept of strategic alliances 
in the end of the 1970s and they defined the strategic alliance as an agreement 
involving two or more organizations for achieving joint strategic goals in order to 
meet their business needs.  
 
 
4.2 Objectives of forming or joining strategic alliance 
Container shipping companies have been facing intense competition and there are 
huge threats in a constantly changing and globalization of world markets with low 
financial performance. In order to improve competitiveness and survive in this fierce 
and rigid business environment, it has been considered and implemented to join or 
form strategic alliances amongst at least two organizations with similar structure and 
compatible objectives to achieve objections. Song and Panayides (2002) said that in 
order to examine the underlying reasons that have induced strategic alliance 
formation in liner shipping, it is important to consider the objectives pursued by 
contemporary shipping lines. The objective modern shipping lines can be classified 




objectives. It can be argued that formation, dissolution and destruction of strategic 
alliances are motivated by the need to get the three objectives. And I sum up the 
researchers‟ finding of objections against forming strategic alliance among container 
shipping firms below (Table 1). I collected information from four research papers, 
Gardiner (1997), Song and Panayides (2002), Panayides and Wiedmer (2011), and 
one class handout, Shuo (2015), and then I reorganized them into three categories 
depends on my classification method.  





Source: Yen (1994), Gardiner (1997), Song and Panayides (2002), Panayides and Wiedmer (2011) and Shuo 
(2015) 
4.2.1 Financial consideration 
In order to increase companies‟ profit, they have two options to achieve; one is by 
increasing revenue and the other is by reducing operating cost. A container carrier 
can increase its revenue by increasing the quantity of its product sold or the price the 
product. However, both are hard to achieve and are not feasible in practice. The liner 
shipping industry is very price sensitive and most lines provide almost same services 




1. reduce and share capital
costs
1. risk and investment
sharing
1. profit maximization 1. economies of scope 1. economies of scale
2. reduce maintenance and
operation of ships
2. economies of scale
2. increase in shareholder
wealth
2. rationalize capacity 2. profit margin
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to customers. In this situation, if one liner service company increase their product 
price, cargo delivery service, customers may look for other shipping lines with 
providing cheaper delivery service. As a result, the line will be loosed their market 
share. Therefore, reducing operating costs will be the only option to get better profit 
for shipping lines. 
 
Figure 14Container ship growth for 50 years 
Source: www.worldshipping.org/about-the-industry/liner-ships/container-ship-design 
 
In addition, container shipping companies have invested to purchase big capacity 
vessels more and more (Figure 14). The reason why they have done that it is well 
known that deploying and operating bigger ships can reduce and minimize the unit 
cost of the vessels because some ship-costs such as capital costs, operating expenses, 
and bunker costs for container ships do not increase as growing of the ship size. This 
means that firms want to make use of scale economies to minimize unit cost by 
operating fleet under the strategic alliance.  
 




which are capital costs, operating expenses and bunker costs. Seafarers hire, 
insurance, stores, maintenance and administration constitute the operating expenses. 
According to Stopford (2009), Administration, stores and crew generally do not 
increase very much as the ship gets bigger, however, insurance and maintenance 
costs are likely to increase in line with the capital cost of the ship, though by less 
than the transport capacity of the ship. Capital costs are subject to economies of scale 
because big ships cost less per container slot than small ones (Stopford, 2009). The 
fuel consumption decline as the size of ship getting bigger.  
 
Figure 15Container ship per TEU transported 
Source: Stopford (2009) 
 
Figure15 shows cost, which denominated in dollar, per TEU transported in a year by 
the ship sizes. The cost of about 650 dollars per TEU for a 1200 TEU container ship 
decreases distinctly to near 500 dollars per TEU for a vessel of 2600 TEU. And 
approximately 450 dollars per TEU for 4300TEU size ship, a little bit lower cost for 
6500 TEU ship and about 400 dollars per TEU for 8500 TEU ship, and almost 360 
dollars per TEU for 11000 TEU containership are shown. As you can see, the bigger 
the size, the lower the cost per TEU.  
 




objections related financial considerations such as operating cost reduction, profit 
maximization, having economies of scale, sharing risk and capital cost with other 
container shipping companies. 
 
4.2.2 Commercial consideration 
Porter (1980) mentioned that the alliance group can increase the bargaining power 
through the purchase together of the items such as equipment, spare parts, and bunker. 
Container shipping companies highly depend on services from third parties such as 
ship agent service companies and bunker supply companies. The generated cost from 
the services provided from the third parties comprise the operating cost for container 
shipping companies, and relative low the cost can be the competitiveness of liner 
shipping firms. Of course, scale economies play a crucial role on lowering the costs. 
Major container delivery service companies like Maersk Line, Evergreen Line, and 
COSCO invest or purchase on dedicated terminals or sometimes acquire their bunker 
supply company. However, it is not feasible strategy to invest the third party 
company from the point of view of not big enough companies, even though, if there 
are major companies, they cannot buy all of the third party service companies in the 
world. In this regard, strategic alliance can provide the benefit of cost down of 
services and material for shipping lines as well as the down the cost per unit of 
container handling, intermodal and feeder services for shippers by combining 
volumes of purchasing and cargoes for delivery through the enlarging the purchasing 
and negotiating power. 
 
In addition to this, alliances help carriers to enter new markets and reinforce their 
global market share. The strategic alliance allowed member of companies to extend 
their services to new destinations this enhancing their role in those regions and 
generating new opportunities for mutual growth. As the world become a one nation 




among countries. This means that the companies should be ready to compete with 
firms in same nation as well as firms located over the border. It is understandable the 
fact that shipper prefer to choose a partner in maritime sector whose has services to 
connect globally than that of offering services limited areas or countries. In addition, 
shippers are looking for the cheap transportation as well. To satisfy the both, offering 
global delivery services and cheap transportation services, shipping lines try to co-
operate by forming strategic alliance as a realistic method to enhance global market 
share (Figure 16). 
 
Figure 16Market share by three groups of strategic alliances 
Source: Alphaliner Weekly Newsletter, Volume 2015, issue 51 
 
Producing high frequency of delivery services is one of objections for creation of 
strategic alliances in liner shipping industry. In the past, shippers did not think about 
daily service from carriers. Sometimes, a few days of service delay were accepted. 
However, this story is not existed at present. Providing timely and frequent 
transportation services to customer than rival companies is considered to get higher 
market share and competitive advantage. Today, on the world‟s main maritime liner 
shipping routes, a monthly service supplier will be out of the market, a fortnightly 
service is too long, a 10-day calling interval is not good enough, and a fixed-day 
weekly has become the standard norm (Shuo, 2015). Deploying similar vessels 




enable the weekly services for satisfying various customers, but also operate fleets 
economically. Shuo also mentioned that more and more shippers today are expecting 
to have a liner service twice a week, or even three or four times a week on some 
selected traffic routes, and to offer high frequency service, shipping lines have to 
work together.  
 
4.2.3 Operational consideration 
The advent of global strategic alliances can be considered as a substantial 
breakthrough in the industry‟s co-operative practice since they are not limited to a 
single trade lane, but aim to cover every major route as well as a number of relevant 
north-south trades and regional/feeder links. At the same time, these strategic 
alliances extend their sea of influence well beyond vessel operations towards the 
shared use of terminals, joint equipment management, inland transport and logistics, 
joint purchasing and procurement (Midoro and Pitto, 2000). 
 
The trend of today in liner shipping industry is that companies purchase big size 
vessels and deploy them to reduce the operating cost as much as possible in the 
situation of low freight rates. The problem caused by the trend is that it is not east to 
sell the whole space in containerships in line with the volatility of demand of 
maritime transportation. The capacity on the ship is perishable. Once the ship leaves 
the loading port whether the vessel‟s capacity used or not, the unsold capacity cannot 
be stored to make a profit and it becomes useless until the ship arrive at loading ports, 
however, the operating costs such as crew, stores, lubricants, repair, maintenance, 
insurance, administration, and etc. are charged to shipping companies. Therefore, 
lines try their best to secure cargoes to make good use of their vessels. Strategic 






Technical and operational know-how may be a valid motive for shipping co-
operations (Shuo, 2015). Some container shipping companies have competitiveness 
toward owning vessels or accessing specific markets monopolistically, however, they 
have not enough expertise to operating their fleets effectively. In this case, the 
shipping lines can learn to increase operating capability by joining strategic alliance. 
This is a kind of the win-win strategy by give-and-take their competitive things 
among members, which share the market access instead of getting fleet operating 
knowledge.  
 
Likewise, operational arrangements such as improving the utilization of ship‟s space 
and getting operational know-how among firms on same strategic alliance can be 
regarded one of objections in liner shipping industry.   
 
 
4.3 Disadvantages of strategic alliance 
Major lines make use most of strategic alliance in their fleet operation to achieve 
their objections, however, there are some problems existed as well. First of all, the 
instability among the member companies of strategic alliance is the representative 
weakness. According to the Song and Panayides (2002), individual organizational 
objectives, the number of partners in an alliance, the nature of the members‟ role and 
contribution to the alliance, and the level of mutual trust and the complexity of the 
task play an important role in alliance instability. This cause the malfunction of the 
operational strategies through the strategic alliance.  
 
Secondly, according to Agarwal (2007), alliances lead to many large scale problems 
at the tactical and the operational planning level such as managing al large pool of 




network to satisfy multiple demands due to various carriers. He also mentioned that 
the members of an alliance should decide on a set of routes to operate their fleet 
together, and they need to decide how to realize these lanes and how the different 
members of the alliance should assign their vessels to the designated routes. In 
addition, the member lines of strategic alliance should settle the problem of how to 
share the profits in an acceptable method to inspire them.  
 
Thirdly, Ryoo and Thanopoulou (1999) stated another drawback as follow, when 
common marketing is involved, flexibility of entry and exit can be jeopardized, not 
only by the sunk marketing costs involved but also by the potential loss of access to 
common marketing networks, involving a potential loss of customers over a 




Chapter 5 Shipping alliance’s effect on the efficiency of container 
lines 
 
The meaning of high efficiency can be defined that when a better outcome is 
achieved with same resources or efforts or when an equivalent result is attained using 
smaller resources than others. There are two types of efficiencies, which are absolute 
efficiency and relative efficiency. The former one means the ratio between input and 
output, and the latter indicates the comparison of efficiencies with the best efficiency 
in the specific group of the efficiency. For example, if we check the two efficiencies 
of three clothes factories related the amount of production over the number of 
employee, the absolute efficiency can be calculated total amount of clothes produced 
divide by the total number of worker and the relative efficiency can be obtained by 
observation how much distinct the two factories of efficiencies from the one highest 
efficiency of factory. In this research paper, I will calculate the relative efficiency of 
shipping lines.   
 
5.1 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
5.1.1 Definition of DEA 
An efficiency can be measured output divide by input simply. This formula has a 
limitation to check the efficiency with only one input and output variable. However, 
when we usually examine efficiency of some companies, we need to think about 
more than one inputs and outputs as relative factors that influence on the efficiency 
results. DEA is a mathematical model that measure the relative efficiency among a 
set of Decision Making Units (DMUs) with capability of dealing with multiple 
output and input variables. In DEA model, the relative efficiency of each DMU can 
be earned through the calculation that a weighted sum of outputs divided by the 





The origins of DEA may trace back to Farrell (1957) who introduced, in the 
methodology of making evaluations from realized deviations from an idealized 
production frontier isoquant, an approach based on developing a piecewise linear 
envelopment of the data in order to determine the frontier (Panayides at el., 2009). 
After that, researchers include Charnes introduced a linear programming 
methodology, DEA-CCR model. DEA, first proposed by Charnes et al. (1978), is a 
non-parametric linear programming based technique used to measure the efficiency 
of operating units, referred to as DMU by comparing their use of multiple inputs to 
produce multiple outputs (Hsu, Chung, Lee and Sherman, 2013). One of the strong 
points of DEA is its non-parametric character, which means that only the 
consumption values of the observed inputs and output production amounts are 
needed in order to assess the relative efficiencies of the DMU properly (Lin, 2013). 
There are two types of statistical procedure, which are the parametric and 
nonparametric statistics. The former one depend on suppositions about the shape of 
the distribution in the inherent population and about the form or parameters such as 
means, median and standard deviations of the expected distribution, while the latter 
one consider no or few guess about the shape or parameters of the population 
distribution from which the sample was drawn. This means that if the collected data 
are deviated highly from the expectation of a parametric procedure, the non-
parametric test should be carried out rather than using parametric test to avoid 
incorrect results. 
 
DEA makes use of frontier line to measure the relative efficiency with an efficiency 
frontier, which represents the best observed performance in the data set. DEA 
measures the efficiency of an organization within a group relative to observed best 
practice within that group (Bhagavath, 2006). The observed best practice is indicated 
as the efficiency frontier like the curve in Figure 17. The red curve represents the 




predicted average behavior of collected DMUs. There are three ways to be a best 
efficiency for DMUs, which are not located in the red efficiency frontier curve by 
reducing the input, increasing the output or both.  
 
Figure 17Theoretical efficiency frontier curve 
Source: Park, A, R. (2014). A port marketing strategy in the wake of new shipping alliance: 
a case study of Busan port, World Maritime University Dissertation, paper 460.  
 
DEA uses variable weights, which are derived directly from the data with the result 
that the numerous a priori assumptions and computations involved in fixed weight 
choices are avoided (Cooper, Seiford and Tone, 2007). This means that it does not 
need an a priori production function to specify how to aggregate the data observed. 
Cooper et al. (2007) also mentioned that in addition to avoiding a need for a priori 
choices of weights, DEA does not require specifying the form of the relation between 
inputs and outputs in, and it does not require these relations to be the same for each 
DMU. 
 
One of the main purpose of a DEA study is to project the inefficient DMUs onto the 
production frontiers. There are three directions, on called input-oriented that aims at 
reducing the input amounts by as much as possible while keeping at least the present 
output levels, and the other called output-oriented, maximizes output levels under at 
most the present input consumption (Cooper et al., 2007). The last one treat the input 






5.1.2 Concepts of efficiency 
Typically, using linear programming, DEA measures the efficiency of an 
organization within a group relative to observed best practice within that group. 
According to Bhagavath (2006), there are different concepts of efficiency below. 
 Technical efficiency 
It is the conversion of physical inputs such as the services of employees and 
machines into outputs relative to best practice. Managerial practices and the scale or 
size of operations affects technical efficiency.  
 Allocative efficiency 
It refers to whether inputs, for a given level of output and set of input prices, are 
chosen to minimize the cost of production, assuming that the organization being 
examined is already fully technically efficient.  
 Cost efficiency 
It refers to the combination of technical and allocative efficiency. An organization 
will only be cost efficient if it is both technically and allocative efficient. Cost 
efficiency is calculated as the product of the technical and allocative efficiency 
scores, which expressed as a percentage.  
 
5.1.3 CCR Model 
The CCR model was initially proposed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes in 1978. It 
considered the constant return to scale (Figure 18), which assumes proportionality 
between input and output variables. There are two type of models, input-oriented 
CCR model and output-oriented CCR model. The former model is to purpose 
reducing the input amounts by as much as possible while keeping at least the present 




the present input consumption (Cooper at el., 2007).  
 
 
Figure 18Production frontier of the CCR Model 
Source: Cooper at el. (2007). Data Envelopment Analysis 
 
In CCR model, the efficiency is the ratio between the sum of multiple inputs and 
outputs, and the ratio should not exceed 1 for every DMU because the purpose is to 
obtain weights for each input and output to maximize the ratio. In addition, the all 
weights should be greater than zero as a non-negativity constraint. The CCR-O 
model to assess the efficiency of DMU can be indicated to the linear program model 
as below (1). 
Max
,
      (1) 
















The   always has an amount of more than 1, CCR-efficiency can be measured 










efficient, and score of below 1 implies inefficient.  
 
5.1.4 BCC Model 
The BCC model was initially proposed by Banker, Charnes and Cooper in 1984. 
According to Cooper at el (2007), the BCC model has its production frontiers 
spanned by the convex hull of the existing DMUs, and the frontier have piecewise 
linear and concave characteristics which leads to variable return to scales (Figure 19) 
characteristics with increasing returns-to-scale, decreasing returns-to-scale and 
constant returns-to-scale. BCC model also have two type of models, which are input-
oriented BCC model and output-oriented BCC model.  
 
Figure 19Production frontier of the BCC Model 
Source: Cooper at el. (2007). Data Envelopment Analysis 
 




1  which we also write 1e  where e is a row vector with all elements 
unity and  is a column vector with all elements non-negative (Cooper at el, 2007). 

































 , and scale efficiency (SE) can 





 . CCR-efficiency called as technical 
efficiency (TE) because it assumes constant returns-to-scale, whereas BCC-
efficiency is regarded as pure technical efficiency (PTE) since it supposes variable 
returns-to-scale of DMUs. Through this definition, a quotation below can be attained 
(3).    




5.2 Application of DEA model 
In my research, the efficiency of six major shipping lines is measured with DEA. 
They are COSCO, K Line, Yang Ming, Hanjin Shipping, Evergreen Line and Maersk 
Line. The first five firms are member of CKYHE Alliance, and the last firm is the 
largest liner service company in terms of TEU in the world. There are five steps to 
apply the DEA model. 
 Step 1. Selection of input and output variables 
 Step 2. Selection of decision making units (DMUs) 
 Step 3. Data collection 
 Step 4. Selection of models for analysis 





5.2.1 Selection of Input and output variables 
The first and the most important stage is to choose input and output variables to 
evaluate the efficiencies of DMUs (shipping lines). In my research, I plan to assess 
two types of efficiencies, which are financial efficiency and operational efficiency. 
Thus, I divide two groups of inputs and outputs (Table 2). To assess the financial 
performance for six lines, total fixed assets and operating costs are used as input 
variables, and gross revenues and operating incomes are employed as output 
variables, while for measuring operational performance, operating capacity in TEUs 
and number of vessels including quantity of owned ships and chartered ships are 
chosen as input variables, and revenue from the result of liner business and total 
handled volume during a year are used as output variables.  
 
Table 2 Inputs and outputs for the research 
 
 
5.2.2 Selection of decision making units (DMUs) 
Throughout my research paper, I want to find out how much the strategic alliance 
affects its member companies in terms of financial and operational efficiency.I 
expect that if I manage to compare the efficiency of relevant companies before and 
after their joining the strategic alliance, I could find out the transition of efficiency as 
well as the influence by the result of the joining a strategic alliance. In this regard, I 
Financial efficiency Operational efficiency
1) Fixed assets (Property ,plant and equipment) 1) Total operating capacity in TEUs
2) Operating cost 2) Number of ship (owned + chartered)
1) Revenue 1) Net revenue (liner service business)






choose five shipping lines, which are members of CKYHE alliance, to examine 
efficiencies. Presently, except the CKYHE alliance, there are three more strategic 
alliances, which are 2M (Maersk and MSC), Ocean 3 (CMA CGM, CSCL, and 
UASC), and G6 (APL, Hapag-Lloyd, HMM, MOL, NYK, and OOCL). However, I 
select the five shipping lines of CKYHE alliance is due to Evergreen, which is joined 
the strategic alliance most recently, in 2014, and before then it never joined a 
strategic alliance. So, I am able to achieve my objection of this research with up-to-
date data. After this, I added one more company, Maersk Line, that is the largest liner 
service company and the most profitable company in the world. The reason why I put 
one more firm to my experiment is because the DEA assesses the relative efficiency 
among the experimental group, DMUs, not the absolute efficiency. Actually, this 
characteristic is one of strengths for DEA method. However, I wanted to know 
further how different between the five companies, member of CKYHE Alliance, and 
the first rank company, Maersk Line, in the containership industry in terms of 
efficiency. Therefore, finally, there are six DMUs in my test. 
 
 Table 3 Decision Making Units 
 
* Source: www.alphaliner.com/top100/inex/php 
 
No. DMU Rank Share
1 Cosco Container Line 4 7.60%
2 “K” Line 15 1.90%
3 Yang Ming Line 10 2.80%
4 Hanjin Shipping Line 8 3.00%
5 Evergreen Line 5 4.70%







The data used in my research are mainly collected from open resources freely such as 
annual reports, financial statements, companies‟ websites, and shipping news 
websites (Tradewinds, Lloyd‟s List), and some data are from shipping research 
reports like Clarkson Shipping Intelligence quarterly reports. The period of data is 
for six years from 2010 to 2015. Those Tables from 4 to 9 show statistics for 
variables used in DEA, which are maximum value, minimum value, average value, 
and standard deviations. 
Table 4 Statistics of variables, 2010 (Units: USD million, TEU thousand) 
 
 
Table 5 Statistics of variables, 2011 (Units: USD million, TEU thousand) 
 
 
Table 6 Statistics of variables, 2012 (Units: USD million, TEU thousand) 
 
 
                                                     
 
1 See Appendix 1 for detail data for six DMUs 
2010 Asset Cost Fleet, TEU Fleet, NO Revenue Net revenue Income Volume
Max 43,343 40,255 2,166 560 45,559 24,022 10,083 14,554
Min 1,559 2,906 319 77 3,472 3,324 404 2,697
Average 11,405 12,684 737 186 14,459 8,099 2,227 5,579
SD 14,549 12,773 648 170 14,406 7,208 3,521 4,175
2011 Asset Cost Fleet, TEU Fleet, NO Revenue Net revenue Income Volume
Max 47,577 45,848 2,521 645 49,917 25,108 9,144 16,222
Min 1,941 3,246 343 80 3,241 3,082 -1,592 3,165
Average 12,887 14,492 826 204 15,043 7,999 1,018 6,189
SD 15,836 14,549 767 200 16,048 7,732 3,663 4,668
2012 Asset Cost Fleet, TEU Fleet, NO Revenue Net revenue Income Volume
Max 42,824 38,160 2,625 596 49,491 27,117 7,694 16,986
Min 1,958 4,384 338 70 4,444 4,178 -1,286 3,244
Average 12,546 13,429 887 200 15,461 9,367 1,061 6,725




Table 7 Statistics of variables, 2013 (Units: USD million, TEU thousand) 
 
 
Table 8 Statistics of variables, 2014 (Units: USD million, TEU thousand) 
 
 
Table 9 Statistics of variables, 2015 (Units: USD million, TEU thousand) 
 
 
Next, from Table 10 to Table 15 presents correlation coefficients among variables 
from 2010 to 2015. All input and output variables through the whole period have a 
positive significant amongst them. Panayides et al (2011) mentioned that the positive 
significant between variables is a necessary and basic hypothesis of DEA approach, 
which is known as “isotonicity”, which makes sure that when input variables 
increase, the output variables will be risen as well, and this result justify the model 
selection.  
 
2013 Asset Cost Fleet, TEU Fleet, NO Revenue Net revenue Income Volume
Max 41,293 36,261 2,631 574 47,386 26,196 7,336 17,678
Min 2,564 4,140 357 69 4,001 3,698 -436 3,016
Average 12,226 12,687 937 204 14,629 8,961 1,126 6,978
SD 13,459 10,908 778 171 14,961 7,820 2,786 5,127
2014 Asset Cost Fleet, TEU Fleet, NO Revenue Net revenue Income Volume
Max 44,671 35,633 2,946 610 47,569 27,351 5,917 18,884
Min 1,199 1,797 355 68 1,877 1,764 -20 3,142
Average 11,943 11,495 1,012 204 13,851 8,513 1,102 7,356
SD 15,151 11,429 889 187 15,624 8,741 2,159 5,547
2015 Asset Cost Fleet, TEU Fleet, NO Revenue Net revenue Income Volume
Max 43,999 31,265 2,962 590 40,308 23,729 1,870 19,044
Min 2,850 4,039 378 68 4,014 3,772 -203 3,149
Average 12,263 10,744 1,052 204 12,453 8,051 360 7,461




Table 10 Correlation coefficients, 2010 
 
 
Table 11 Correlation coefficients, 2011 
 
 




Table 13 Correlation coefficients, 2013 
 
2010 Asset Cost Fleet, TEU Fleet, NO Revenue Net revenue Income Volume
Asset 1.000
Cost 0.997 1.000
Fleet, TEU 0.968 0.950 1.000
Fleet, NO 0.965 0.946 0.999 1.000
Revenue 0.997 1.000 0.950 0.946 1.000
Net revenue 0.998 0.992 0.975 0.970 0.992 1.000
Income 0.992 0.979 0.986 0.983 0.979 0.995 1.000
Volume 0.988 0.984 0.959 0.957 0.984 0.988 0.977 1.000
2011 Asset Cost Fleet, TEU Fleet, NO Revenue Net revenue Income Volume
Asset 1.000
Cost 0.997 1.000
Fleet, TEU 0.977 0.959 1.000
Fleet, NO 0.968 0.948 0.999 1.000
Revenue 0.998 0.999 0.964 0.955 1.000
Net revenue 0.998 0.991 0.984 0.977 0.994 1.000
Income 0.949 0.929 0.970 0.974 0.941 0.965 1.000
Volume 0.985 0.975 0.977 0.966 0.973 0.983 0.920 1.000
2012 Asset Cost Fleet, TEU Fleet, NO Revenue Net revenue Income Volume
Asset 1.000
Cost 0.990 1.000
Fleet, TEU 0.958 0.938 1.000
Fleet, NO 0.944 0.921 0.998 1.000
Revenue 0.987 0.997 0.950 0.936 1.000
Net revenue 0.994 0.990 0.973 0.962 0.995 1.000
Income 0.926 0.936 0.950 0.946 0.959 0.961 1.000
Volume 0.977 0.939 0.968 0.960 0.937 0.965 0.883 1.000
2013 Asset Cost Fleet, TEU Fleet, NO Revenue Net revenue Income Volume
Asset 1.000
Cost 0.987 1.000
Fleet, TEU 0.958 0.938 1.000
Fleet, NO 0.941 0.917 0.997 1.000
Revenue 0.984 0.998 0.947 0.930 1.000
Net revenue 0.995 0.991 0.972 0.958 0.994 1.000
Income 0.960 0.969 0.963 0.957 0.982 0.982 1.000





Table 14 Correlation coefficients, 2014 
 
 
Table 15 Correlation coefficients, 2015 
 
5.2.4 Selection of analysis models 
This study will be adapted data envelopment analysis (DEA) to assess financial and 
operational efficiency of six DMUs. Especially, I will employ output-oriented CCR 
and BCC model that aims to maximize outputs without adding input values because 
it is better idea to increase outputs such as handled total volume of container, 
operating income and profit using firm‟s assets like ships, container and cranes rather 
than minimizing input elements in container shipping industry.  
 
The CCR-O model measures technical efficiency for DMUs. However, the CCR 
model has a drawback that cannot evaluate pure technical efficiency because it 
assumes that all observed DMUs operate at an optimal scale. Bang at el, (2012) 
mentioned that in a real world, in liner service industry, there are situations which 
limit operation at the optimal scale such as imperfect competition, conference 
systems, cabotage rules, and regulatory exemptions from anti-trust laws. Because I 
2014 Asset Cost Fleet, TEU Fleet, NO Revenue Net revenue Income Volume
Asset 1.000
Cost 0.979 1.000
Fleet, TEU 0.952 0.900 1.000
Fleet, NO 0.946 0.891 0.998 1.000
Revenue 0.985 0.997 0.923 0.916 1.000
Net revenue 0.996 0.993 0.936 0.927 0.996 1.000
Income 0.970 0.958 0.964 0.963 0.976 0.971 1.000
Volume 0.978 0.918 0.949 0.946 0.927 0.955 0.924 1.000
2015 Asset Cost Fleet, TEU Fleet, NO Revenue Net revenue Income Volume
Asset 1.000
Cost 0.979 1.000
Fleet, TEU 0.966 0.935 1.000
Fleet, NO 0.958 0.925 0.999 1.000
Revenue 0.980 0.999 0.946 0.936 1.000
Net revenue 0.995 0.991 0.969 0.961 0.993 1.000
Income 0.995 0.978 0.943 0.933 0.975 0.986 1.000




want to make up for this weakness, I will also use the BCC-O model. With technical 
efficiency and pure technical efficiency by the CCR-O and BCC-O model 
respectively, I will have one more efficiency, scale efficiency for DMUs. 
 
5.2.5 Efficiency analysis 
To measure the efficiencies of CCR-O and BCC-O models, I will utilize aDEA-
SOLVER (Learning version 8.0)
2
, which is an Excel based software.  
  
I will introduce basic procedure to calculate efficiencies with the DEA-SOLVER 
through an example. Table 16 presents the data of 2 inputs (asset and cost) and 2 
outputs (revenue and income) for six DMUs (C, K, Y, H, E, and M). 
Table 16 Data for operational efficiency analysis with 2 inputs and 2 outputs 
 
 
This table can be conversion into 2ⅹ6 matrix with X (inputs) and Y (outputs) through 
Table 17.  
                                                     
 
2 See Appendix 2 for finding steps of using DEA-SOLVER 
DMU (I)Asset (I)Cost (O)Revenue (O)Income
C 9,911 12,426 14,252 1,130
K 6,648 9,817 11,219 667
Y 2,311 3,457 4,145 484
H 4,662 7,240 8,104 593
E 1,559 2,906 3,472 404




Table 17 Conversion table 
 
 





























There are some assumption to measure the efficiency ( ). The “  ” and ” ” 
indicate weight factor for Y and X respectively. 




























To evaluate the efficiency, the linear program (LP) for DMU C is indicated below.  
(3) LP for DMU C 
DMU (I)Asset (I)Cost (O)Revenue (O)Income
C X11 X21 Y11 Y21
K X12 X22 Y12 Y22
Y X13 X23 Y13 Y23
H X14 X24 Y14 Y24
E X15 X25 Y15 Y25
























The optimal solution of “
1
 ” and ”
1
 ” for DMU C can be gained by the DEA-
SOLVER, and weight vectors are shown in Table 18. 
Table 18 Optimal weight vectors 
 
(4) Optimal weight factors , “ ” and ” ” 
- 5.041.8
1
 E , 02   
- 0
1
 , 0541.82  E  
 
Withthese weight factors, I could calculate the efficiency for DMU C.  











DMU v( 1) v( 2) u( 1) u( 2)
C 0 8.41E-05 7.02E-05 0
K 0 1.07E-04 8.91E-05 0
Y 8.13E-06 2.84E-04 2.22E-04 1.65E-04
H 3.86E-06 1.45E-04 1.23E-04 0
E 6.42E-04 0 2.88E-04 0





These (1) to (5) sequence are used to measure the operational and financial efficiency 










Chapter 6 Analysis of results 
 
This chapter shows the results of analyzing the financial efficiency and operational 
efficiency, which were obtained with DEA-SOLVER (Learning version 8.0) for six 
years, from 2010 to 2015. There are three types of efficiency scores, which are: 
technical efficiency calculated by CCR-O model, pure technical efficiency measured 
by BCC-O model, and scale efficiency (SE). The SE scores are calculated by 
dividing the technical efficiency score by the pure efficiency score. Returns-to-scale 
characteristics, which are increasing returns-to-scale (IRS), constant returns-to-scale 
(CRS), and decreasing returns-to-scale (DRS), are presented as well.  
 
6.1 Interpretation of DEA 
It is important to notice that the DEA model furnishes outcomes that only consider 
the relative efficiency of DMUs in the collection. For example, the efficiency scores 
of the six lines in my research represent each line‟s efficiency relative to the other 
five lines‟ efficiency, and its efficiency cannot represent the absolute efficiency of the 
entire group ofshipping lines.  
 
There are seven cases of results by DEA using CCR-O model and BCC-O model.  
 Case 1: The case in which, a company is CCR-efficient and BCC-efficient.  
 Case 2: The case in which, a company is BCC-efficient but CCR-inefficient. The 
company can improve CCR-efficiency by increasing its scale (input variables). 
 Case 3: The case in which a company is BCC-efficient but CCR-inefficient. The 
company can improve CCR-efficiency by decreasing its scale (input variables). 
 Case 4: The case in which a company is CCR-inefficient and BCC-inefficient. The 




 Case 5: The case in which a company is CCR-inefficient and BCC-inefficient. The 
company can improve CCR-efficiency by decreasing its scale (input variables). 
 Case 6: The case in which a company is CCR-inefficient and BCC-inefficient with 
relatively high scale efficiency. This implies it is helped by its scale even though the 
company is inefficiently operated. The company can improve CCR-efficiency by 
increasing its scale (input variables). 
 Case 7: The case in which a company is CCR-inefficient and BCC-inefficient with 
relatively high scale efficiency. This impliesthat it is helped by its scale even though 
the company is inefficiently operated. This company can improve CCR-efficiency 
by decreasing its scale (input variables). 
Table 19 Seven cases of results 
 






6.2.1 Technical efficiency 
Figure 20 shows the results of financial efficiency scores in CCR-O model for six 
container shipping firms during six years. Maersk is efficient for the whole period. K 
                                                     
 








Case 1 1 1 1 CRS
Case 2 Below 1 1 below 1 IRS
Case 3 Below 1 1 below 1 DRS
Case 4 Below 1 below 1 below 1 IRS
Case 5 Below 1 below 1 below 1 DRS
Case 6 Below 1 below 1 close to 1 IRS




Line is efficient for four years and inefficient for two years (2010 and 2012), even 
though the efficiency scores are close to 1 for both years. Efficiency scores for the 
Yang Ming and Hanjin lines fluctuated during six years, with the lowest value of 
around 0.83 for both. COSCO experienced high variation for six years, from the 
highest score of about 0.73 in 2012 to the lowest score of around 0.97 in 2015. 
Evergreen had high efficiency scores before joining the strategic alliance in 2014, 
with an efficiency score of 1 for three consecutive years since 2010 and close to 1 in 
2013. However, 2014 and 2015 witnessed lower efficiency scores than before. This is 
quite an interesting result, which is opposite from my expectation. I assumed that if a 
liner shipping company cooperates with other companies in forming a strategic 
alliance, the company would gain financial benefits with the help of scale economies.  
 
Figure 20Results of financial efficiency, CCR-O model 
Source: Author‟s own work based on results 
 
To analyze in more detail, I use another histogram (Figure 21), which indicates 
average financial efficiency by members of the CKYH alliance from 2010 to 2013 
and the CKYHE alliance in 2014 and 2015. In addition, I included financial 
efficiency scores for Evergreen (indicated as “E” in the graph) and Maersk (indicated 
as “M” in the graph) in the graph to compare with the average scores. Evergreen‟s 
efficiency score is higher than average scores of the four firms that were members of 




little bit ahead of the score for Evergreen in 2013. In the following year, the 
efficiency score for Evergreen dropped to approximately 0.9. In 2015, the score for 
Evergreen decreased further than the previous year, while an average efficiency score 
of five lines, which were members of the CKYHE alliance escalated from the score 
of 2014.  
 
Figure 21Average financial efficiency, CCR-O model 
Source: Author‟s own work based on results 
 
6.2.2 Pure technical efficiency 
Figure 22 presents the financial efficiency score in the BCC-O model, which 
assumes in variable returns-to-scale for DMUs. K Line, Yang Ming, Evergreen, and 
Maersk are efficient for almost the entire time period. The efficiency scores for 
COSCO and Hanjin experience fluctuation over the six years, even though the range 
of the fluctuation for Hanjin, from around 0.86 to 1, is lower than COSCO, which 
fluctuates from about 0.76 to 1. 
 




Source: Author‟s own work based on results 
According to Figure 23, efficiency scores for Evergreen and Maersk are higher than 
average scores for members of the CKYH alliance and CKYHE alliance except in 
2010, during which all were BCC-efficient. 
 
Figure 23Average financial efficiency, BCC-O model 
Source: Author‟s own work based on results 
 
6.2.3 Scale efficiency 
Scale efficiency is measured through the calculation of technical efficiency, earned 
from the CCR model, divided by pure technical efficiency, gained from the BCC 
model. Generally, the CCR-efficiency does not exceed BCC-efficiency (Cooper at el., 
2007).  
 
Figure 24Scale efficiency in financial efficiency analysis    





Figure 24 shows the outcomes of scale efficiency for six lines from 2010 to 2015. 
Maersk is efficient in its scale during the whole period, and K Line is almost in scale-
efficient except for two years in 2010 and 2012. COSCO and Hanjin are very similar 
in scores of scale efficiencies. Even though they are both volatile for six years in the 
efficiency scores in the CCR-O and BCC-O models, their scale efficiency scores are 
higher than 0.9. This means that their financial management is inefficiently operated, 
but their outputs are helped by the scales, which are dominant against other DMUs. 
For the case of Yang Ming, it is almost efficient for the entire time period in the 
BCC-O model except in the year of 2011 with a value of 0.95, but its scale efficiency 
scores are lower than other DMUs. This is because of lower technical efficiency 
scores from 2012 to 2015. If the company increases its inputs variables, the scales 
efficiency scores will be higher as it has the returns-to-scale characteristic of IRS 
(see Table 20), which stands for increasing returns-to-scale. The shape of 
Evergreen‟sefficiency scores is exactly the same as thehistogram of the efficiency 
scores in the CCR-O model. The falling scores of technical efficiency motivate 
decreasing the scale efficiency scores as well as the average financial efficiency 
score for the CKYHE alliance in 2014 and 2015.  
 
Figure 25 Average scale efficiency in financial efficiency analysis 
Source: Author‟s own work based on results 
 




two shipping lines. The average scale efficiency score for four lines, the members of 
the CKYH alliance, fluctuates around 0.95 for the first three observed years, and 
increases to about 0.99 in 2014. The scores for the member of the CKYHE alliance 
drop for the last two years like the efficiency scores for Evergreen. Meanwhile, 
Maersk is scale-efficient for the entire time period. I summarize the analysis of 
financial efficiency in the Table 20.  
Table 20 Summary of financial efficiency scores, 2010-2015 
 






6.3.1 Technical efficiency 
                                                     
 
4 See Appendix 4 for results of operational efficiency for each year between 2010 and 2015 
Lines 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
CCR 0.96 0.90 0.73 0.76 0.80 0.98
BCC 1.00 0.90 0.78 0.82 0.82 1.00
RTS DRS CRS IRS IRS IRS IRS
SE 0.96 0.999 0.93 0.92 0.97 0.98
CCR 0.95 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00
BCC 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
RTS DRS CRS DRS CRS CRS CRS
SE 0.95 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00
CCR 1.00 0.94 0.90 0.84 0.91 0.89
BCC 1.00 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
RTS CRS CRS IRS IRS IRS IRS
SE 1.00 0.984 0.90 0.84 0.91 0.89
CCR 0.93 0.94 0.88 0.84 0.88 0.90
BCC 1.00 0.95 0.89 0.86 0.89 0.95
RTS DRS CRS DRS IRS IRS IRS
SE 0.93 0.996 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.95
CCR 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.90 0.88
BCC 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00
RTS CRS CRS CRS IRS IRS IRS
SE 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.91 0.88
CCR 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
BCC 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
RTS CRS CRS CRS CRS CRS CRS










Figure 26 presents the results of the operational efficiency scores for six lines using 
the CCR-O model. Two DMUs, COSCO and K Line, are CCR-efficient for six years, 
whereas four DMUs are CCR-inefficient for the same test years. Yang Ming shows 
an increasing trend during the first three years from about 0.92 to 1 and a decreasing 
trend for the last three years from around 0.88 to just above of 0.7. Three firms 
(Hanjin, Evergreen, and Maersk) out of four firms in an inefficient group experience 
fluctuation during the entire time period. The efficiency scores for Hanjin are above 
0.8, while those for Evergreen and Maersk are below than 0.7. In particular, 
Evergreen witnessed the highest inefficiency scores between 2010 and 2015.  
 
Figure 26Results of operational efficiency, CCR-O model 
Source: Author‟s own work based on results 
 
To scrutinize the impact of joining a strategic alliance on operational performances, I 
analyzed the average operational efficiencies of members in the CKYH alliance from 
2010 to 2013 and the CKYHE alliance from2014 to 2015 (Figure 27). The CCR-
efficiency scores for Evergreen before joining a strategic alliance are lower than 
those for firms that were members of the CKYH alliance, and after forming the 
CKYHE alliance, that does not change. The relative efficiency scores are still low, 
they are lower than the values for the period when Evergreen was not a member of 





Figure 27Average operational efficiency, BCC-O model 
Source: Author‟s own work based on results 
 
6.3.2 Pure technical efficiency 
A histogram, shown in Figure 28, indicates BCC-efficiency scores and a transition of 
numbers for six years. Three DMUs, which are COSCO, K Line, and Maersk, are 
BCC-efficient during the entire observed period. Yang Ming are BCC-efficient for 
the first five years, and it is about 24 percent inefficient in 2015. The efficiency 
scores for Hanjin in BCC-O model change; they are between about 0.81 and 0.95. 
Evergreen‟s scores are consistantly lower than other firms‟ scores. They are below 
0.55. 
 
Figure 28Results of operational efficiency, BCC-O model 
Source: Author‟s own work based on results 
 




CKYH alliance is close to one (BCC-efficiency) from 2010 to 2013, and Evergreen‟s 
BCC scores are between 0.4 and 0.5 within the same period. Although Evergreen 
joined the strategic alliance in 2014, its relative BCC-efficiency values are not 
positively affected, its scores for the last two years are lower than the values between 
2011 and 2013.   
 
Figure 29Average operational efficiency, BCC-O model 
Source: Author‟s own work based on results 
 
6.3.3 Scale efficiency 
I divided the results of scale efficiency scores for six DMUs (Figure 30) into three 
groups with similar features.  
 
Figure 30Scale efficiency in operational efficiency analysis  
Source: Author‟s own work based on results 
 




during the entire period, while also being CCR and BCC efficient. Hanjin and 
Evergreen are placed into the second group with similar high scale efficiency scores, 
even though they are inefficient in both CCR and BCC models with lower efficiency 
scores than their scale efficiency scores. This means that, relatively, their scale 
efficiencies prevail over other companies‟ scores. As Table 21 demonstrates, 
Evergreen has high scale efficiency scores, in spite of the state of inefficiency with 
its average CCR-efficiency score of 0.44 and the average BCC-efficiency score of 
0.47. The firms in the last group are Yang Ming and Maersk. Their scale efficiency 
values are relatively low compared to their BCC-efficiency values, due to low CCR 
scores. However, they have different returns-to-scale characteristics. Maersk has 
DRS, which stands for decreasing returns-to-scale, and Yang Ming has IRS, which 
means increasing returns-to-scale. By reducing input variables, Maersk can have 
more outputs, whereas by deploying more input variables, Yang Ming is able to gain 
better results.  
 
Figure 31 displays average scale efficiency in evaluation of operational efficiency. 
The average efficiency scores for members of the CKYH alliance and CKYHE 
alliance changeover the six years with scores higher than approximately 0.93 each 
year. Two lines‟ scores are also altered during the years with the highest scores (about 
0.94) for Evergreen and the lowest scores (about 0.68) for Maersk, both on average. 
 




Source: Author‟s own work based on results 
 
Table 21 Summary of operational efficiency scores, 2010-2015 
 
Source: Author‟s own work 
 
 
6.4 Overview of analysis 
6.4.1 Average financial efficiency scores 
Figure 32 shows the results of analysis on financial performance indicated average 
values for six years. The graph contains the combined results of average scores of 
CCR efficiency and BCC efficiency for six years. A red dot is located in the upper 
right corner indicates a line is efficient financially. 
 
According to the diagram, Maersk is the most financially efficient firm with an 
average efficiency score of 1 in both the CCR-O and BCC-O model. K Line is the 
Lines 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
CCR 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
BCC 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
RTS CRS CRS CRS CRS CRS CRS
SE 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
CCR 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
BCC 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
RTS CRS CRS CRS CRS CRS CRS
SE 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
CCR 0.94 0.96 1.00 0.88 0.83 0.72
BCC 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.76
RTS IRS IRS CRS IRS IRS CRS
SE 0.94 0.96 1.00 0.88 0.83 0.95
CCR 0.86 0.94 0.83 0.80 0.89 0.80
BCC 0.90 0.95 0.83 0.81 0.92 0.81
RTS DRS IRS CRS DRS CRS CRS
SE 0.96 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.96 0.99
CCR 0.39 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.38 0.41
BCC 0.43 0.50 0.53 0.51 0.42 0.46
RTS DRS IRS DRS DRS DRS DRS
SE 0.93 1.00 0.94 0.95 0.92 0.89
CCR 0.70 0.69 0.63 0.71 0.64 0.68
BCC 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
RTS DRS DRS DRS DRS DRS DRS










second most financially efficient firm with a BCC-efficiency score of 1. The third 
most efficient company is Evergreen with BCC and CCR efficiency scoresjust a bit 
lower than K Line. COSCOoperates its financial resource the most ineffectively 
compared to the other five lines.  
 
 Figure 32Average financial efficiency 
 Source: Author‟s own work based on results 
 
6.4.2 Average operational efficiency scores 
On the other hand, as shown in Figure 33, COSCO is the one of two firms that 
possesses the highest average operational efficiency score. The other firm is K Line 
with an efficiency score of 1 in both the CCR-O and BCC-O models. Yang Ming is 
located more closely to the upper right side than Hanjin. Maersk is the fourth 
efficient line with a BCC-O score of 1 and a CCR-O score of about 0.68. Lastly, 
Evergreen received the highest inefficiency scores of the six firms. 
 
Figure 33Average operational efficiency 




6.4.3 Transition of efficiencies for Evergreen Line 
The purpose of this research is to explore the influence that forming a strategic 
alliance on a liner shipping company‟s efficiencies, in this case Evergreen. This, I 
examined the transition of efficiency scores by separating two types of efficiencies, 
financial and operational efficiency. The graphs (Figure 34 and 35) present two types 
of efficiency scores measured by the CCR-O and BCC-O models for Evergreen Line 
from 2010 to 2015. There are some common features between them. First of all, the 
CCR scores for the financial model and operational model drop in 2014, when 
Evergreen began cooperating with other lines as a member of the CKYHE alliance. 
In addition, the BCC score of operational performance declined in the same year. 
Secondly, financial efficiency scores are higher than operational efficiency scores 
during the observed period. Evergreen is always BCC-efficient financially except in 
2014, and its financial management is almost always CCR-efficient except in 2014 
and 2015. Lastly, its operational efficiency scores for both models are low with 
values fluctuating between 0.4 and 0.6. 
 
Figure 34 Evergreen‟s efficiencies in CCR-O modelFigure 35Evergreen‟s efficiencies in BCC-O model 
Source: Author‟s own work based on results        Source: Author‟s own work based on results 
 
The scale efficiency graph also presents a similar situation to the CCR-O and BCC-O 
models. Scale efficiency scores for both financial efficiency and operational 
efficiency analysis shows a downward trend after 2014, except in the operational 





Figure 36Evergreen‟s scale efficiency 
Source: Author‟s own work based on results 
 
To scrutinize in detail, I calculated average efficiency scores by dividing the 
periodsbefore and after of formation of the CKYHE alliance, which are from 2010 to 
2013 and from 2014 to 2015 (Table 22). There are three spaces, which blue, white, 
and red, in the table. The blue space indicates anefficiency score that is more than 0.3 
higher than the score from the former period (2010-2013). The red area is the 
opposite of the blue area, representing an efficiency score that is more than 0.3 lower 
than that of the former period. The last white spacerepresents similar scores between 
the two periods, with a maximum differences of 0.3. According to the results, after 
forming the CKYHE alliance, only COSCO‟s financial efficiency scores is increased 
more than 0.3, and its operational scores arethe same between the two periods. The 
operational and financial efficiency scores of three lines‟, K Line, Hanjin, and 
Maersk, are almost unchanged before and after forming the shipping alliance. 
Financial efficiency for Yang Ming is nearly similar, however, the average 
operational efficiency scores for last two years are quite lower than those of the first 
four years. Evergreen‟s efficiency scores for 2014 and 2015 are lower than the 
average efficiency scores from 2010 to 2013 with a difference in scores of 0.3 in both 






Table 22 Average efficiency scores for Evergreen 
 
Source: Author‟s own work 
*F.E: Financial Efficiency, O.E: Operational Efficiency  
 
According to Table 23, it is required that Evergreen and Yang Ming need to change 
their amounts inputs to enhance their efficiencies. Evergreen‟s RTS characteristics 
for financial and operational analysis are opposite to IRS and DRS respectively for 
the last three years. This means that Evergreen should increase its scale of financial 
management and reduce the level of operational management by employing larger 
vessels and upgrading fleet utilization rates through more cooperation with members 
of the strategic alliance. Yang Ming should expand its fleet to make use of scale 
economies.  
Table 23 Summary of returns-to-scale (RTS) characteristics by DEA 
 
Source: Author‟s own work 
*F.E: Financial Efficiency, O.E: Operational Efficiency  
Lines
F.E CCR BCC SE CCR BCC SE CCR BCC SE
2010-2013 0.83 0.87 0.95 0.98 1.00 0.98 0.92 0.99 0.93
2014-2015 0.89 0.91 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.90 1.00 0.90
O.E CCR BCC SE CCR BCC SE CCR BCC SE
2010-2013 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.94
2014-2015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.88 0.89
Lines
F.E CCR BCC SE CCR BCC SE CCR BCC SE
2010-2013 0.90 0.92 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
2014-2015 0.89 0.92 0.97 0.89 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00
O.E CCR BCC SE CCR BCC SE CCR BCC SE
2010-2013 0.86 0.87 0.99 0.47 0.49 0.95 0.68 1.00 0.68
2014-2015 0.85 0.87 0.98 0.40 0.44 0.91 0.66 1.00 0.66
MaerskHanjin Evergreen
COSCO "K" Line Yang Ming
DMUs Efficiency 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
F.E DRS CRS IRS IRS IRS IRS
O.E CRS CRS CRS CRS CRS CRS
F.E DRS CRS DRS CRS CRS CRS
O.E CRS CRS CRS CRS CRS CRS
F.E CRS CRS IRS IRS IRS IRS
O.E IRS IRS CRS IRS IRS CRS
F.E DRS CRS DRS IRS IRS IRS
O.E DRS IRS CRS DRS CRS CRS
F.E CRS CRS CRS IRS IRS IRS
O.E DRS IRS DRS DRS DRS DRS
F.E CRS CRS CRS CRS CRS CRS










In summary, through the analysis of efficiency I found that the average relative 
efficiency scores of Evergreen for two years after joining a shipping allianceare 
lowerthan its average efficiency scores for four years just before joining shipping 
alliance. This means that I could expect that the joining strategic alliance has a 
negative effect on the Evergreen‟s financial and operational efficiencies, however, it 











Chapter 7 New generation of strategic alliance 
 
7.1 Formation of new strategic alliances 
Presently (2016), there are four groups of strategic alliances, which are 2M (Maersk 
and MSC), CKYHE (COSCO, K Line, Yang Ming, Hanjin, and Evergreen), G6 
(APL, Hapag-Lloyd, HMM, MOL, NYK, and OOCL), and Ocean 3 (CMA CGM, 
CSCL, and UASC). However, the liner shipping industry will be changed 
enormously due to appearance of new strategic alliance groups, Ocean alliance and 
THE alliance, in 2017, resulting in three strategic alliance structures in the industry.  
 
Figure 37Overview of alliance changes, 2016-2017 
Source: Murphy, A. (2016). The three final alliances. Lloyd‟s List. 
 
These new alliances will be formed by reshuffling thelines that are members of the 
existing three strategic alliances. Figure 37 shows the overview of alliance 




changetheirmembers. CMA CGM, China COSCO, Evergreen, and OOCL will 
cooperate firmly by forming a new alliance, named Ocean alliance. In addition to one 
of the new alliances, Hanjin, Yang Ming, K Line, Hapag-Lloyd, MOL and NYK will 
operate their fleets under the same roof as members of THE alliance. Two potential 
members of THE alliance are UASC and HMM. UASC is under the consideration of 




7.2 Comparison among strategic alliances 
These days, one of the hot issues in the liner shipping industry is the restructuring of 
the strategic alliances. The reason is that the groups of strategic alliances have a 
significant influence on liner business. According toK Line‟s factbook 2015 (Figure 
38), four strategic alliances occupy more than 90 percent of the market share on both 
trade routes, which are Asia-Europe and Asia-North America. In addition to this, the 
lines were belonging to strategic alliances are able to make use of economies of scale 
so that they can be survived in the market if low freight rates occur, caused by over 
capacity of vessels. In addition, the global cooperation helps container shipping firms 
maximizing of their resources, such as fleets, networks, and services, andminimize 
their operating costs. With these crucial advantages, it can be said that nonmember 
lines are taught to make a profit to even survive in the international container 
delivery business.   
 




Source: “K” Line‟s FACTBOOK 2015, www.kline.co.jp 
To compare the new strategic alliances and forecast the market powers, I investigated 
the total fleet capacity (current owned fleets + charted fleets + orderbook) in TEUs 
for the alliances (Figure 39). Currently, the 2M alliance operates more vessels than 
the other two alliances. However, if considering the volume of orderbook, 2M and 
Ocean alliance will be almost the same in line with volume of fleets. It is a fact that 
THE Alliance has a relatively smaller orderbook (587,492 TEUs) and a lower current 
operating capacity than the 2M Alliance (872,509 TEUs) and Ocean Alliance 
(1,290,174 TEUs). 
 
Figure 39Total operated fleets and orderbook, based on June 2016 
Source: Own graph, data from Alphaliner 
 
Ocean Alliance and THE Alliance are going to launch their new services in April 
2017, severe competition is expected with 2M, the remaining alliance. The three 
strategic alliances are predicted to compete along two main routes, which are the 
Asia-North America route and Asia-North Europe route. According to Alphaliner 
(Table 24), on the one hand, Ocean Alliance and THE Alliance will be expected to 
have similar market share on the Asia-North America service route with 39% each, 
while 2M will possess 16% of market share on the same trade route. On the other 
hand, 2M, Ocean Alliance, and THE Alliance will be competing intensely with one 
another with similar market shares of 34%, 35% and 30% respectively. In addition to 




the contract period, 2M will be existed for 10 years, whereas OCEAN Alliance and 
THE Alliance will be maintained for 5 years. This difference in time period will give 
each alliance distinct advantages, which are stability for a longer period contract and 
flexibility for a shorter period of contract. In terms of number of members, 2M is 
only formed by only two firms, and THE Alliance is structured by eight firms, 
including two pending firms, HMM and UASC. This may cause a discrepancy in the 
speed of communications and decisions, which may affect the competitiveness of the 
firms.  
Table 24 Summary on restricting of strategic alliances 
 
Source: Author‟s own work, based on the data from Alphaliner 
* The number 6(2) for THE Alliance implies 6 confirmed members and 2 unfixed members. 
2M OCEAN Alliance THE Alliance
2 4 6(2)
Q1, 2015 Q2, 2017 Q2, 2017
Asia-North America 16% 39% 39%
Asia-Europe 34% 35% 30%
10 years 5 years 5 years
Members (No.)
Start date of service
Contract period





Chapter 8 Conclusion and recommendation 
 
The liner shipping industry has witnessed a huge wave of structure change due to the 
restructuring of strategic alliances. This research measured the two types of 
efficiency, which are financial efficiency and operational efficiency, to observe a 
transition of efficiency for six lines, which are COSCO, K Line, Yang Ming, Hanjin, 
Evergreen, and Maersk, for the period between 2010 and 2015. DEA method is used 
to calculate efficiency scores, and in particular, output-oriented CCR model and BCC 
model are adapted to measure the technical efficiency and pure technical efficiency, 
respectively. 
 
The main findings are as fallows.To begin, according to the results of financial 
performance analysis, I separatedthe six lines into four groups based on the similar 
characteristics. Maersk Line is categorized into the first group as the most efficient 
company, both CCR-efficient and BCC-efficient for six years. The members of the 
second group are K Line and Evergreen Line; both were BCC-efficient, even though 
the CCR-efficiency score of K Line is a little bit higher, 0.99, compared toEvergreen 
Line‟s 0.96. Yang Ming and Hanjin Shipping are included in the third group with 
similar efficiency scores. The company that operated financial resources most 
inefficiently among the six lines is COSCO, a member of the last group with lower 
CCR and BCC efficiencies than scale efficiency.Moreover, I dividedthe four groups 
pertaining to the similar aspects by the result of operational performance analysis. 
COSCO and K Line are the most efficient lines during the test period, and they are 
classified into the same group. Yang Ming is a member of the second group with 0.89 
in the CCR-model and 0.96 in the BCC-model. Hanjin Shipping and Evergreen Line 
have similar resultsfor operational efficiency with the fact that their scale efficiency 
scores are higher than their CCR-efficiency and BCC-efficiency scores. Two 
companies are helped by their scales, even though they have relatively lower 




the CCR-O model and 53% inefficient in the BCC-O model. Maersk is categorized 
into a separated group, being both BCC-efficient and CCR-inefficient (32%). Lastly, 
through the analysis of average efficiency by dividing the years studied into two 
periods, the first four years (2010-2013) and the last two years (2014-2015), I found 
that Evergreen had not experienced a positive impact on both financial and 
operational efficiencies after joining a strategic alliance, with lower average 
efficiency scores than those during 2010 to 2013. In addition, Yang Ming‟s 
operational average efficiency scores were also dropped after forming the CKYHE 
alliance in 2014, while efficiency scores of the other three members of the CKYHE 
alliance were stable before and after the strategic alliance. Only COSCO‟s financial 
average efficiency scores were improved with more than 0.3 from former years. 
 
There are some recommendationsto improve the efficiencies by making using of the 
results of returns-to-scale characteristics. First of all, Evergreen has the 
characteristics of increasing returns-to-scale from the financial efficiency analysis 
and decreasing returns-to-scale from the operational efficiency analysis. Therefore, 
Evergreen needs to increase financial related inputs (fixed asset and operating cost) 
and to decrease the operational related inputs (total operating capacity and number of 
ships) to increase its efficiency. This can be realized by employing larger vessels as 
well as by raising the utilization rates of ships by expanding the scale of strategic 
alliances among members. Lastly,Yang Ming needs to increaseits scale to enhance its 
efficiency scores with the same characteristics of increasing returns-to-scales from 
financial and operational efficiency analysis. To do that, Yang Ming should invest 
more inships to have a larger scale of operating fleets through purchasing new or 
second-hands ships or chartering ships.  
 
There are some limitations existing in this research paper as well. First, the 
insufficient number of input and output variables for performance analysis is a 




each to measure the financial and operational efficiency because it was difficult to 
collect valuable numerical data from the open sources, such as annual reports of 
firms and shipping news websites. It can be said that an efficiency analysis with a 
small number of variables only represents part of the lines‟ efficiencies. Therefore, in 
the future research, it will be necessary to adapt a greater number of inputs and 
outputs in order to explain performance on complex liner businesses.Second, another 
drawback in this paper is the scarce number of DMUs. According to Cooper at el. 
(2007), if the number of DMUs is less than the combined number of inputs and 
outputs, a large portion of the DMUs will be identified as efficient, and the efficiency 
discrimination among DMUs will be questionable due to an inadequate number of 
degrees of freedom. They also suggest that the number of DMUs needs to be equal to 
or greater than max{no. of outputno. of input, 3 (no. of input + no. of output)}. 
Last, this study dealt with financial data coming from different accounting systems, 
which lead to bias among the data. Mainly, to measure financial efficiency, I 
collected data from the financial statements of six lines, which adapt three types of 
accounting rules, China GAAP, US GAAP, and IFRS (Table 25). Future studies 
should avoid this inconsistency.  
Table 25 Accounting systems used by six lines, 2010 - 2015 
 
Source: Author‟s own work, based on the data from financial statements for six lines
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Appendix 1 – Raw Data for DMUs used by efficiency analysis and 
exchange rates for currency conversion 
 
1) DMU 1 
 
2) DMU 2 
 




Segments 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 Unit
Property, plant and equipment 13,471 13,007 13,231 12,780 11,295 9,911 USD million
Operating cost 8,792 10,210 10,895 11,431 13,856 12,426 USD million
Total capacity 858 819 788 717 653 528 TEU Thousand
No. of vessels 164 163 171 159 148 135 Number
Revenue 9,135 10,864 10,750 10,818 13,091 14,252 USD million
Operating revenue (container shipping) 7,117 8,170 7,853 7,705 6,404 6,848 USD million
Operating income 515 169 -212 -1,286 -1,592 1,130 USD million
Handled volume 9,828 9,438 8,702 8,016 6,910 6,215 TEU Thousand
GAAP
"K" Line
Segments 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 Unit
Property, plant and equipment / fixed assets 4,821 5,975 6,776 8,304 7,747 6,648 USD million
Operating costs 9,582 11,597 11,510 13,016 11,861 9,817 USD million
Total capacity 378 355 357 343 343 324 TEU Thousand
No. of vessels 68 68 69 70 80 77 Number
Revenue 10,276 12,776 12,544 14,213 12,180 11,219 USD million
Operating revenue (container shipping) 5,146 6,469 6,051 7,040 4,999 5,095 USD million
Operating income 78 453 296 186 -508 667 USD million
Handled volume 3,149 3,142 3,016 3,244 3,165 3,094 TEU Thousand
U.S. GAAP
Yang Ming
Segments 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 Unit
Property, plant and equipment / net properties 2,850 1,199 3,020 2,999 2,414 2,311 USD million
Operating cost 4,039 1,797 4,140 4,384 3,701 3,457 USD million
Total capacity 529 416 383 338 343 319 TEU Thousand
No. of vessels 99 91 90 81 83 77 Number
Revenue 4,014 1,877 4,001 4,444 3,553 4,145 USD million
Operating revenue (container shipping only) 3,772 1,764 3,698 4,178 3,347 3,951 USD million
Operating income -203 39 -203 -66 -317 484 USD million





4) DMU 4 
 
5) DMU 5 
 
*Handled volume for Evergreen Line is calculated in proportion to the ratio of the operating handled 
volume to operating revenue for Yang Ming. 
6) DMU 6 
 




Segments 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 Unit
Property, plant and equipment, net 5,050 5,422 6,473 6,411 6,345 4,662 USD million
Operating cost 6,626 7,826 8,643 8,953 8,439 7,240 USD million
Total capacity 634 598 649 576 486 469 TEU Thousand
No. of vessels 105 95 121 110 102 102 Number
Revenue 6,773 8,009 8,406 9,033 8,279 8,104 USD million
Operating revenue (container shipping) 4,690 5,477 5,647 5,720 5,054 5,351 USD million
Operating income 19 -20 -436 -127 -465 593 USD million
Handled volume 4,624 4,553 4,748 4,477 4,167 3,706 TEU Thousand
IFRS
Evergreen Line
Segments 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 Unit
Property, plant and equipment / fixed assets 3,387 1,386 2,564 1,958 1,941 1,559 USD million
Operating cost 4,160 1,907 4,673 4,628 3,246 2,906 USD million
Total capacity 952 937 815 721 611 614 TEU Thousand
No. of vessels 200 195 200 183 167 162 Number
Revenue 4,211 2,009 4,686 4,769 3,241 3,472 USD million
Operating revenue (container shipping only) 3,850 1,845 4,322 4,441 3,082 3,324 USD million
Operating income -121 52 -26 -38 -153 404 USD million
Handled volume 4,102 4,150 4,162 3,928 3,197 2,697 TEU Thousand
GAAPIFRS
Maersk Line
Segments 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 Unit
Property, plant and equipment 43,999 44,671 41,293 42,824 47,577 43,343 USD million
Operating cost 31,265 35,633 36,261 38,160 45,848 40,255 USD million
Total capacity 2,962 2,946 2,631 2,625 2,521 2,166 TEU Thousand
No. of vessels (owned + chartered) 590 610 574 596 645 560 Number
Revenue 40,308 47,569 47,386 49,491 49,917 45,559 USD million
Operating revenue (container shipping) 23,729 27,351 26,196 27,117 25,108 24,022 USD million
Operating income 1,870 5,917 7,336 7,694 9,144 10,083 USD million
Handled volume 19,044 18,884 17,678 16,986 16,222 14,554 TEU Thousand
IFRS
Currency 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010
USD/TWD 31.78 71.82 29.71 29.57 33.37 31.49
USD/JPY 121.06 105.86 97.59 79.84 79.83 87.81
USD/KRW 1132.33 1053.58 1094.66 1126.44 1107.56 1156.53
USD/CNY 6.28 6.16 6.15 6.31 6.47 6.77




Appendix 2 – Steps for using DEA-SOLVER 
 
1) Step 1     2) Step 2 
 
3) Step 3     4) Step 4 
 
5) Step 5     6) Step 6 
 














DMU CCR BCC SE CCR CCR, No. BCC BCC, No.
COSCO 0.96 1.00 0.96 DRS Y 0 C 0
"K" Line 0.95 1.00 0.95 DRS Y 0 K 1
Yang Ming 1.00 1.00 1.00 CRS Y 3 Y 0
Hanjin 0.93 1.00 0.93 DRS Y, E 0 K, E, M 0
Evergreen 1.00 1.00 1.00 CRS E 1 E 1
Maersk 1.00 1.00 1.00 CRS M 0 M 1
Average, CKYH 0.96 1.00 0.96
Average, all 0.97 1.00 0.97





DMU CCR BCC SE CCR CCR, No. BCC BCC, No.
COSCO 0.90 0.90 0.999 CRS K, M 0 K, E, M 0
"K" Line 1.00 1.00 1.000 CRS K 3 K 3
Yang Ming 0.94 0.95 0.984 CRS K, E 0 K, E, M 0
Hanjin 0.94 0.95 0.996 CRS K, M 0 K, E, M 0
Evergreen 1.00 1.00 1.000 CRS E 1 E 3
Maersk 1.00 1.00 1.000 CRS M 2 M 3
Average, CKYH 0.94 0.95 0.99
Average, all 0.96 0.97 1.00





DMU CCR BCC SE CCR CCR, No. BCC BCC, No.
COSCO 0.73 0.78 0.93 IRS E, M 0 Y, M 0
"K" Line 0.98 1.00 0.98 DRS E, M 0 K 1
Yang Ming 0.90 1.00 0.90 IRS E, M 0 Y 1
Hanjin 0.88 0.89 0.99 DRS E, M 0 K, E, M 0
Evergreen 1.00 1.00 1.00 CRS E 4 E 1
Maersk 1.00 1.00 1.00 CRS M 4 M 2
Average, CKYH 0.87 0.92 0.95
Average, all 0.92 0.94 0.97
















DMU CCR BCC SE CCR CCR, No. BCC BCC, No.
COSCO 0.76 0.82 0.92 IRS M 0 Y, M 0
"K" Line 1.00 1.00 1.00 CRS K 3 K 1
Yang Ming 0.84 1.00 0.84 IRS K, M 0 Y 1
Hanjin 0.84 0.86 0.98 IRS K, M 0 K, E, M 0
Evergreen 0.99 1.00 0.99 IRS K 0 E 1
Maersk 1.00 1.00 1.00 CRS M 3 M 2
Average, CKYH 0.86 0.92 0.94
Average, all 0.90 0.95 0.95





DMU CCR BCC SE CCR CCR, No. BCC BCC, No.
COSCO 0.80 0.82 0.97 IRS M 0 Y, M 0
"K" Line 1.00 1.00 1.00 CRS K 3 K 1
Yang Ming 0.91 1.00 0.91 IRS K, M 0 Y 3
Hanjin 0.88 0.89 0.99 IRS K, M 0 K, Y, M 0
Evergreen 0.90 0.99 0.91 IRS K, M 0 Y, M 0
Maersk 1.00 1.00 1.00 CRS M 4 M 3
Average, CKYHE 0.90 0.94 0.96
Average, all 0.92 0.95 0.96





DMU CCR BCC SE CCR CCR, No. BCC BCC, No.
COSCO 0.98 1.00 0.98 IRS M 0 C 0
"K" Line 1.00 1.00 1.00 CRS K 3 K 1
Yang Ming 0.89 1.00 0.89 IRS K, M 0 Y 1
Hanjin 0.90 0.95 0.95 IRS K, M 0 K, Y, M 0
Evergreen 0.88 1.00 0.88 IRS K, M 0 E 0
Maersk 1.00 1.00 1.00 CRS M 4 M 1
Average, CKYHE 0.93 0.99 0.94
Average, all 0.94 0.99 0.95
















DMU CCR BCC SE CCR CCR, No. BCC BCC, No.
COSCO 1.00 1.00 1.00 CRS C 3 C 2
"K" Line 1.00 1.00 1.00 CRS K 4 K 0
Yang Ming 0.94 1.00 0.94 IRS C, K 0 Y 0
Hanjin 0.86 0.90 0.96 DRS C, K 0 C, M 0
Evergreen 0.39 0.43 0.93 DRS C, K 0 C, M 0
Maersk 0.70 1.00 0.70 DRS K 0 M 2
Average, CKYH 0.95 0.97 0.97
Average, all 0.82 0.89 0.92





DMU CCR BCC SE CCR CCR, No. BCC BCC, No.
COSCO 1.00 1.00 1.00 CRS C 4 C 2
"K" Line 1.00 1.00 1.00 CRS K 4 K 2
Yang Ming 0.96 1.00 0.96 IRS C, K 0 Y 2
Hanjin 0.94 0.95 0.99 IRS C, K 0 C, K, Y 0
Evergreen 0.50 0.50 0.9996 IRS C, K 0 C, K, Y 0
Maersk 0.69 1.00 0.69 DRS C, K 0 M 0
Average, CKYH 0.98 0.99 0.99
Average, all 0.85 0.91 0.94





DMU CCR BCC SE CCR CCR, No. BCC BCC, No.
COSCO 1.00 1.00 1.00 CRS C 1 C 2
"K" Line 1.00 1.00 1.00 CRS K 2 K 2
Yang Ming 1.00 1.00 1.00 CRS Y 2 Y 0
Hanjin 0.83 0.83 0.99 CRS C, K 0 C, K 0
Evergreen 0.50 0.53 0.94 DRS Y 0 C, K, M 0
Maersk 0.63 1.00 0.63 DRS K, Y 0 M 1
Average, CKYH 0.96 0.96 1.00
Average, all 0.83 0.89 0.93















DMU CCR BCC SE CCR CCR, No. BCC BCC, No.
COSCO 1.00 1.00 1.00 CRS C 4 C 2
"K" Line 1.00 1.00 1.00 CRS K 4 K 2
Yang Ming 0.88 1.00 0.88 IRS C, K 0 Y 0
Hanjin 0.80 0.81 1.00 DRS C, K 0 C, K, M 0
Evergreen 0.48 0.51 0.95 DRS C, K 0 C, K, M 0
Maersk 0.71 1.00 0.71 DRS C, K 0 M 2
Average, CKYH 0.92 0.95 0.97
Average, all 0.81 0.89 0.92





DMU CCR BCC SE CCR CCR, No. BCC BCC, No.
COSCO 1.00 1.00 1.00 CRS C 4 C 2
"K" Line 1.00 1.00 1.00 CRS K 2 K 1
Yang Ming 0.83 1.00 0.83 IRS C 0 Y 0
Hanjin 0.89 0.92 0.96 CRS C, K 0 C, K 0
Evergreen 0.38 0.42 0.92 DRS C 0 C, M 0
Maersk 0.64 1.00 0.64 DRS C, K 0 M 1
Average, CKYHE 0.82 0.87 0.94
Average, all 0.79 0.89 0.89





DMU CCR BCC SE CCR CCR, No. BCC BCC, No.
COSCO 1.00 1.00 1.00 CRS C 4 C 3
"K" Line 1.00 1.00 1.00 CRS K 4 K 3
Yang Ming 0.72 0.76 0.95 CRS C, K 0 C, K 0
Hanjin 0.80 0.81 0.99 CRS C, K 0 C, K 0
Evergreen 0.41 0.46 0.89 DRS C, K 0 C, K, M 0
Maersk 0.68 1.00 0.68 DRS C, K 0 M 1
Average, CKYHE 0.79 0.81 0.97
Average 0.77 0.84 0.92
No. of Efficient DMUs 2 3 2
Efficiency
RTS
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